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Introduction
‘In an effort to secure the rule of law, a court may happen to exceed judicial 
competence.’1 These introductory lines of a memorable dissenting opinion capture 
the internal tensions of a truly historic judgment. By order of 14 January 2014 
the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, FCC) took, 
for the very first time, the decision to refer a preliminary question to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECJ).2 
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1 Diss. opinion Lübbe-Wolff, FCC, Case 2 BvR 2728/13 et al. OMT, order of 14 Jan. 2014, 
para. 2.
2 FCC, Case 2 BvR 2728/13 et al. OMT, order of 14 Jan. 2014. The decision was published 
on 7 Feb. 2014. EN translation available at: <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions/
rs20140114_2bvr272813en.html.
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In essence, the Federal Constitutional Court’s reference addresses the question 
of whether the so-called Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme of 
the European Central Bank (ECB) is in conformity with EU law. The OMT 
programme goes back to an internal decision of the ECB’s Governing Council 
that was communicated via press release on 6 September 2012.3 With this decision 
the bank established a framework for the purchase of a potentially unlimited 
amount of government bonds of select EU member states on the secondary mar-
ket. According to the press release, a strict condition for any purchase is that the 
member states concerned implement a macroeconomic adjustment programme 
or a precautionary programme within the framework of the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) or its predecessor, the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF). The announcement of the OMT programme was preceded by a statement 
by ECB President Draghi of 26 July 2012 that the Bank would do ‘whatever it 
takes’ within its mandate to save the euro.4 Until today, the OMT programme 
has not yet been put into effect and it probably never will be, given that its an-
nouncement alone had an immediate ‘tranquilizing’ effect on the financial markets. 
The preliminary reference of the Federal Constitutional Court’s Second Senate 
marks an important turning point in its case-law on European integration. While 
the Court had already evinced its general willingness to refer preliminary questions 
to the ECJ on several occasions in the past,5 it left a number of obvious oppor-
tunities to do so unexploited.6 The dialogue between the two courts is henceforth 
entering a new phase. Deeming the reference an act of submission or even a call 
for help for ‘fear of its own courage’7 would entirely miss the point. The pre-
liminary ruling is not part of a hierarchically structured system of judicial review. 
It rather pays tribute to the idea of a functional allocation of judicial responsi-
bilities in a multi-levelled setting, a setting within which the mandate for interpret-
ing Union law is attributed to the ECJ – also and particularly vis-à-vis national 
constitutional courts. 
While the very fact that Karlsruhe makes a preliminary reference to Luxembourg 
has thus to be strongly welcomed in general, the underlying legal premises of the 
3 Available at <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html>. Accord ing 
to the protocol of session 340 of the ECB’s Governing Council of 5/6 Sept. 2012 the content of the 
decision was reproduced only in a press release. A formal record of the decision does not exist, cf. 
EGC, case T-492/12 von Storch u.a./EZB, order of 10 Dec. 2013, para. 2.
4 Speech on the occasion of the ‘Global Investment Conference in London’ of 26 July 2012.
5 Notably FCC, Case 1 BvR 256/08 et al. Data Retention, judgment of 2 March 2010, paras. 
185-186.
6 In particular FCC, Case 2 BvR 2236/04 European Arrest Warrant; FCC Data Retention,
supra n. 5 at paras. 185-186; FCC, Case 1 BvR 1215/07 Counter-terrorism Database, judgment of 
24 April 2013, paras. 88-91. 
7 This is how the reference was perceived by some journalists, cf. Steltzner, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung of 7 Feb. 2014. 
265Exceeding Judicial Competence in the Name of Democracy
OMT reference remain highly questionable under the concrete circumstances. 
This is primarily due to the fact that the reference emanates from a so-called ultra 
vires review, i.e., the exercise of the FCC’s self-proclaimed right to decide as a court 
of last instance whether an EU institution has transgressed its competences under 
the treaties.8 On the one hand, the Federal Constitutional Court brings the ECJ 
into the game, enabling the latter to give its interpretation of the Treaties with 
regard to OMT. On the other hand, the Bundesverfassungsgericht holds the view 
that it has to comply only ‘in principle’ with the ECJ’s decisions as a binding in-
terpretation of Union law.9 By claiming the right to carry out an ultra vires review, 
the FCC precisely undermines the ECJ’s monopoly of interpretation under Ar-
ticle 19(1), second sentence, TEU and Article 344 TFEU which a preliminary 
reference is meant so secure. In this light, the OMT preliminary reference connects 
national constitutional law and EU law in an ominous way. The two dissenting 
opinions of senior Judges Lübbe-Wolff and Gerhardt bear witness to just how 
controversial the decision was even within the Second Senate.
The German Federal Constitutional Court’s OMT reference (next para.) already 
raises serious concerns from the perspective of national constitutional law (para. 
‘Constitutional law perspective’). The reference, which resembles a call for allegiance 
rather than a question, is also highly questionable on account of its discussion of 
EU law – particularly in consideration of the reactions it may elicit in Luxembourg 
(para. ‘EU law perspective and Luxembourg’s range of options’). Insofar as Karl-
sruhe relies on comparative law, however, the Court’s argument reveals an interest-
ing transnational dimension which goes beyond the framework of national 
constitutional and EU law in a narrower sense (para. ‘Transnational dimension: 
Comparative legal reasoning). It is the sad irony of the OMT reference that, in a 
doubtlessly well-intentioned effort to protect the principle of democracy against 
an alleged excess of competences at the EU level, the FCC itself exceeds the limits 
of its judicial mandate under German constitutional and EU law. Against this 
backdrop, one might finally ask which particular role constitutional courts could 
constructively play within the framework of a preliminary reference procedure 
(para. ‘Outlook: What role for constitutional courts in preliminary ruling proceed-
ings’).
The OMT reference: Context and main argument 
The preliminary reference is embedded in the context of EU-wide efforts to over-
come the financial crisis. Contrary to all promises of efficient crisis management 
8 For an in-depth analysis of the concept, see F.C. Mayer, Kompetenzüberschreitung und 
Letztentscheidung (Beck 2000), p. 11 et seq.
9 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 24 with reference to FCC, Case 2 BvR 2661/06 Honeywell, 
order of 6 July 2010.
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by the executive, the increasing shift towards inter-governmental decision-making 
has not only demonstrated a distressing degree of inefficiency, but first and foremost 
has posed a fundamental threat to the democratic decision-making processes at 
national and EU level.10 
Pr e c e d e n t i a l  c o n t e x t 
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the principle of democracy lies at 
the heart of the Federal Constitutional Court’s crisis-related jurisprudence. The 
OMT reference is just one of several decisions that assess the ‘rescue measures’ 
from this particular angle of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz – GG). First 
decisions of the Court tackled the constitutionality of the domestic approval to 
bilateral financial aids for Greece and the EFSF,11 but also the particular modes of 
parliamentary involvement12 and parliamentary rights to information.13 Other 
national constitutional or supreme courts that reviewed the constitutionality of 
rescue measures or their domestic implications14 include the Supreme Court of 
Estonia,15 the French Constitutional Council,16 the Irish Supreme Court,17 the 
Portuguese Constitutional Tribunal,18 the Polish Constitutional Tribunal19 and 
the Austrian Constitutional Court.20 
10 For reform proposals aiming at strengthening the democratic decision-making processes see 
I. Pernice et al. (eds.), A Democratic Solution to the Crisis (Nomos 2012) p. 104 et seq.; Group
‘Glienicke’, ‘Towards a Euro Union’ (available at <www.glienickergruppe.eu/english.html>);
M. Poiares Maduro et al. (eds.), ‘The Democratic Governance of the Euro’, 8 RSCAS Policy Paper
(2012).
11 FCC, Case 2 BvR 987/10 et al. Greece & EFSF, judgment of 7 Sept. 2011, para. 101. For 
a critical and in-depth analysis of several reform proposals see P. Leino and J. Salm, ‘Should the 
Economic and Monetary Union Be Democratic after All?’, 14 GLJ (2013) p. 844, 863 et seq.
12 FCC, Case 2 BvE 8/11 Special Parliamentary Committee, judgment of 28 Jan. 2012, paras. 
113 et seq. 
13 FCC, Case 2 BvE 4/11 Right to information (ESM & Euro Plus Pact), judgment of 19 June 
2012, paras. 94 et seq., 107.
14 For a comparative overview see E. Fahey and S. Bardutzky, ‘Judicial Review of Eurozone 
Law’, MJIL (2013) p. 101, 105 et seq.; Fabbrini, ‘The Euro-Crisis and the Courts’, Berkeley Journal 
of International Law (2014 forthcoming).
15 Estonian Supreme Court, Case 3-4-1-6-12 ESM, judgment of 12 July 2012.
16 French Conseil constitutionnel, Case 2012-653 DC TSCG, decision of 9 Aug. 2012.
17 Irish Supreme Court, Case 2012 OJ (C 303) 18 Pringle, decision of 31 July 2012.
18 Portuguese Constitutional Court, Case 353/2012 State Budget Law 2012 and Case 187/2013 
State Budget Law 2013, judgment of 5 April 2013.
19 Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Case K 33/12 Amendment of Article 136 TFEU, judgment 
of 26 June 2013.
20 Austrian Constitutional Court, Case SV 1/2013-15 TSCG, judgment of 3 Oct. 2013. 
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ESM & TSCG Decision of 12 September 2012 (summary review)
The proceeding, in the course of which the Bundesverfassungsgericht finally de-
cided to take the road to Luxembourg, is one of the largest in the entire history 
of the Court. The number of individual complainants alone amounted to more 
than 37,000, an unparalleled number. Moreover, the proceeding was accompanied 
by an unprecedented media hype that reached its climax just before the decision 
of 12 September 2012 when the whole world seemed to look at the relatively small 
city of Karlsruhe. In its much-noted decision21 – the paragraphs of which have 
recently been renumbered22 – the FCC allowed Germany, on the basis of a sum-
mary review, to ratify the three challenged reform instruments, i.e., the amendment 
of Article 136 TFEU,23 the ESM Treaty24 and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance (TSCG)25 at a relatively early stage and far ahead of the decision 
on the principal proceedings. While the Court did not identify constitutional 
obstacles to the ratification of the amendment of Article 136 TFEU and the TSCG, 
it permitted the ratification of the ESM Treaty only on two conditions. Both re-
quirements were addressed immediately in the aftermath of the decision by an 
interpretative declaration of the contracting parties.26 In substantive terms, the 
decision of 12 September 2012 was characterized particularly by a remarkably 
strong manifestation of judicial restraint.27 
21 FCC, Case 2 BvR 1390/12 et al., ESM & TSCG (summary review), judgment of 12 Sept. 
2012. The accompanying legislation, particularly the ESM financing law, was also subject to review. 
For case notes in English see particularly the contributions in 14 GLJ (2013) p. 1 et seq. 
22 The decision was originally divided into 319 paragraphs, see still NJW (2012) p. 3145; EuR 
(2013) p. 75; DVBl (2012) p. 1370. The renumbered DE version now (2014) comprises only 
215 paragraphs. However, the EN translation (available at <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/
entscheidungen/rs20120912_2bvr139012en.html>) is still based on the original numbering with a 
total of 319 paragraphs. To make it even more complicated, the preliminary EN version published 
on 12 Sept. 2012 was incomplete at the time and consisted only of 240 paragraphs (the numbering 
of which did not correspond to the DE version at the time). This article refers to the EN version of 
2014 with 319 paragraphs [EN 2014].
23 European Council Decision, 25 March 2011, EUCO 10/11, ANNEX II, p. 21, in force 
since 1 May 2013.
24 Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism, signed on 2 Feb. 2012, in force since 
27 Sept. 2012.
25 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(TSCG), also known as the ‘Fiscal Treaty’ or ‘Fiscal Compact’, signed on 2 March 2012 by all EU 
member states except the Czech Republic and the UK, in force since 1 Jan. 2013.
26 Declaration on the ESM of 27 Sept. 2012, available at: <www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/132615.pdf>.
27 In detail M. Wendel, ‘Judicial Restraint and a Return to Openness’, 14 GLJ (2013), p. 22, 
41 et seq. 
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ESM & TSCG decision of 18 March 2014 (principal proceedings)
Even though the Federal Constitutional Court had already clarified the most 
fundamental legal questions in its decision of 12 September 2012, it deliberately 
left open several aspects for a more in-depth examination. These leftovers include 
the legal assessment of the European Central Bank’s crisis management on the one 
hand and several constitutional questions related to admissibility and parliamen-
tary participation on the other hand. Whereas the former leftovers led to the OMT 
preliminary reference, the latter were addressed in the judgment on the principal 
proceedings of 18 March 2014.28 This judgment largely meets previous expecta-
tions as it essentially amounts to a repetition of the earlier summary review and 
specifies several questions related to admissibility and parliamentary participation. 
For instance, the Court declares the applications in the inter-institutional proceed-
ing (Organstreit) inadmissible insofar as they aim at a two-thirds majority require-
ment for parliamentary approval for certain decisions under the ESM.29
Decisions at EU level
At EU level, both the Court of Justice and the General Court have dealt with 
questions related to the financial crisis. In its landmark decision on Pringle the 
ECJ declared that the introduction of Article 136(3) TFEU on the basis of the 
simplified amendment procedure as well as the conclusion and ratification of the 
ESM Treaty by the member states of the Eurozone, were in conformity with EU 
law.30 The thesis according to which normativity was replaced by mere necessity 
during the crisis31 was countered by the Grand Chamber with a methodologi-
cally sound reasoning.32 In particular the ECJ demonstrated why the so-called 
‘no-bailout clause’ (the somewhat misleading popular denomination of Article 
125 TFEU) had not been infringed.33 This question had been vigorously debated 
in the literature before.34 
28 FCC, Case 2 BvR 1390/12 et al., ESM & TSCG (principal proceedings), judgment of 
18 March 2014.
29 Ibid., para. 157.
30 ECJ, Case Rs. C-370/12 Pringle, judgment of 27 Nov. 2012. 
31 See Ch. Joerges, ‘Europas Wirtschaftsverfassung in der Krise’, 51 Der Staat (2012) p. 357, 
378-381 with further references. Critically (and justifiably so) D. Thym, JZ (2013) p. 259 et seq.
32 Which – with a view to the judgment’s audience – is certainly not only coincidentally based
on a Savigny approach, see D. Thym and M. Wendel, ‘Préserver le respect du droit dans la crise’, 
Cahiers de droit européen (2012) p. 733, 744-745, 753-754.
33 ECJ Pringle supra n. 30 at paras. 129-147.
34 The discussion already started with bilateral financial aids and the EFSF, see exemplarily 
on the one hand Ruffert, ‘The European Debt Crisis and European Law’, 48 CMLRev. (2011) 
p. 1777, 1785-1787 (violation of Art. 125 TFEU) and on the other hand de G. Merino, ‘Legal
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It is a fruitful exercise to compare Pringle with the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s 
ESM decisions, most notably in terms of legal standards and methodological ap-
proaches, but also as regards the decisions’ results, which can be considered func-
tionally equivalent.35 Above all, Pringle constitutes an eminent point of reference 
for Karlsruhe in its OMT reference. However, as we will see, the Federal Consti-
tutional Court essentially inverts the ECJ’s key argument in a way that is highly 
questionable under EU law. 
The only institution at EU level that has been directly confronted with the 
validity of actions taken by the European Central Bank during the crisis so far is 
the General Court. By order of 16 December 2011 it rejected the individual action 
for annulment directed against the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme (SMP) 
as inadmissible.36 By order of 10 December 2013 the General Court also re-
jected the individual action for annulment directed against OMT as inadmissible.37 
The General Court rightly pointed out that the claimants – more than 5,000 and 
almost all of them also engaged before the German Federal Constitutional Court 
– failed to demonstrate that they were directly concerned by the OMT programme,
given that its implementation depended on further acts within the discretionary
power of the European Central Bank. However, the General Court explicitly
highlighted the possibility that the applicants could challenge future implement-
ing acts before national courts and, within this framework, could try to initiate a
preliminary reference to the Court of Justice.38
Th e  OMT  r e f e r e n c e  i n  a  n u t s h e l l
Exactly one week after the General Court had rejected the action against OMT 
as inadmissible, the German Federal Constitutional Court separated the applica-
tions relating to the European Central Bank’s activities from the main proceedings 
in the ESM case.39 
developments in the Economic and Monetary Union During the Debt Crisis’, 49 CMLRev. (2012) 
p. 1613, 1626-1630 (compatibility with Art. 125 TFEU under certain conditions).
35 For a closer examination see Thym and Wendel, supra n. 32 at p. 749 et seq. and Ch. Calliess,
‘Der ESM zwischen Luxemburg und Karlsruhe’, NVwZ (2013) p. 97, 99 et seq.
36 The time limit under Art. 263(6) TFEU had expired, EGC, Case T-532/11 Städter/EZB, 
order of 16 Dec. 2011, paras. 7 et seq.; affirmed by ECJ, Case C-102/12 P Städter/EZB, order of 
15 Nov. 2012. 
37 EGC, Case T-492/12 von Storch u.a./EZB, judgment of 10 Dec. 2013, paras. 35, 38 et seq. 
38 Ibid., para. 47.
39 FCC, Case 2 BvR 1390/12 et al., OMT-separation, order of 17 Dec. 2013. As a matter of 
fact, the applications that explicitly addressed the OMT programme had been submitted not until 
the aftermath of the FCC’s interlocutory decision of 12 Sept. 2012. Prior to this date, only one 
group of claimants had raised an ultra vires claim in relation to bond purchases by the ECB on the 
secondary market.
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By referring preliminary questions the Bundesverfassungsgericht essentially wants 
to see its own legal interpretation confirmed, according to which the OMT pro-
gramme, firstly, is not covered by the mandate of the ECB and second, violates 
Article 123 TFEU. According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the OMT is 
to be seen predominantly as a measure of economic policy which exceeds the 
competences attributed to the European Central Bank under EU primary law and 
encroaches upon the competences of EU member states in the field of economic 
policy. This assessment is based on a variety of observations, namely the pro-
gramme’s objectives, the fact that it envisages the purchase of government bonds 
only of select member states (selectivity), the circumstance that it is linked to eco-
nomic reform programmes under the EFSF or ESM (conditionality), or rather that 
it envisages the purchase of bonds in addition to these assistance programmes 
(parallelism), the terms and conditions of which might thus be undermined 
(bypassing).40 In short, in the eyes of the Court the OMT programme resembles 
a functional equivalent to the reform programmes – an equivalent, however, which 
lacks the necessary degree of parliamentary legitimation and control. 
The second violation of EU primary law identified by the Federal Constitu-
tional Court consists in a forbidden circumvention of Article 123 TFEU (prohibi-
tion of monetary financing). Beyond the arguments already mentioned, the Court 
particularly refers to the following aspects in order to support its claim: the lack 
of a quantitative limitation of the envisaged purchase of government bonds (vol-
ume); an alleged absence of a time lag between possible purchases by the ECB on 
the secondary market and their prior emission on the primary market (market 
pricing); the possibility of holding purchased government bonds to maturity (in-
terference with market logic); the lack of any specific requirements on credit ratings 
of the government bonds to be purchased (default risk); the equal treatment of the 
European System of Central Banks and private as well as other government bond-
holders (debt cut)41; and last but not least the ECB’s (indirect) encouragement of 
market participants to purchase said bonds on the primary market (encouragement 
to purchase newly issued securities).42
Although the Federal Constitutional Court considers the alleged violations to 
be manifest, it holds the view that the OMT programme could still be inter-
preted in accordance with EU law, most notably if its implementation was lim-
ited in such a way that it would not undermine the conditionality of the reform 
programmes and would only be of a supportive nature with regard to the eco-
nomic policies in the Union. With regard to Article 123(1) TFEU, this would, 
according to the Court, require particularly the exclusion of a debt cut, a quanti-
40 FCC OMT, supra n. 2, question no. 1 lit. a.
41 Ibid., question no. 1 lit. b.
42 This aspect is only raised within the context of auxiliary question no. 2 lit. b ff.
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tative limitation of bond purchases ex ante and last but not least the prevention 
of interferences with market price formation ‘where possible’.43 In other words, 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht aims at establishing red lines for a programme whose 
implementation is likely rendered unnecessary by virtue of the effectiveness of its 
mere announcement.
When comparing the OMT case with earlier proceedings before the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, one should note a fundamental difference: unlike 
its predecessors the OMT case does not address the constitutional review of in-
tergovernmental crisis management, a policy for which the federal government is 
accountable to the federal parliament (Bundestag) and on which the Bundestag 
must have a continuous and decisive say. Instead, in OMT the Court (indirectly) 
reviews actions of the European Central Bank, an institution designed and ex-
pected to be independent according to both EU law (Article 130 TFEU) and 
constitutional law (Article 88(2) GG) – independent also, if not particularly, from 
the parliament.44 
Constitutional law perspective
The OMT reference already raises several serious concerns from the perspective 
of national constitutional law.
P l u s  u l t r a :  t h e  e x p a n s i o n  o f  u l t r a  v i r e s  r e v i e w 
Regarding the conditions of ultra vires review, the decision departs from previous 
case law in several ways. 
Ultra vires review: conceptual foundations and precedents
The concept of ultra vires review is a product of judicial lawmaking. Against the 
explicit suggestion of the Bundesverfassungsgericht,45 the German (constitutional) 
legislature has until today refrained from enacting specific procedural provisions 
for the exercise of ultra vires or identity review.46 
As is well known, the German Federal Constitutional Court’s claim to de cide 
whether EU institutions have exceeded their competences is not a new phenom-
43 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 100.
44 Cf. already FCC, Case 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 Treaty of Maastricht, judgment of 12 Oct. 
1993, para. 154. The FCC also refers to this precedent, see FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 32.
45 FCC, Case 2 BvE 2/08 et al. Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 30 June 2009, para. 241.
46 Discussion of relevant suggestions in M. Wendel, Permeabilität im europäischen Verfassungsrecht 
(Mohr Siebeck 2011) p. 479 et seq. 
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enon.47 In the Court’s case-law this approach was foreshadowed as early as 
1971,48 followed by increasingly articulate indications in 198149 and 1987.50 The 
first open claim to review whether acts of EU law exceed the competencies at-
tributed to the EU was made in the Maastricht judgment of 1993,51 the essence 
of which had already been anticipated by the academic writings of judge rappor-
teur Paul Kirchhof.52 The practical modalities as well as the conceptual foundation 
of this judicial reservation were further substantiated in the Lisbon judgment of 
2009, henceforth under the topos of ‘ultra vires review’.53 As a consequence of the 
constitutional principle of ‘openness towards European law’ (Europarechtsfreund-
lichkeit), the Court restricted ultra vires review to ‘obvious transgressions’ and to 
situations in which legal protection could not be obtained at EU level.54 In Lisbon, 
the Second Senate also clarified that within the domestic judicial system only the 
Federal Constitutional Court itself shall be entitled to carry out an ultra vires re-
view.55 In substance, the Court also included adherence to the principle of sub-
sidiarity within its ultra vires review.56 
The Lisbon judgment also refined the idea of conceptualising the principle of 
conferral through the lens of national constitutional law. According to the Court, 
the principle of conferred powers is not only a principle of EU law, but the ‘expres-
sion of the foundation of Union authority in the constitutional law of the Mem-
ber States’.57 Despite of its own claim of autonomy,58 EU law is thus reduced to 
a mere derivative of national sovereign powers,59 an interpretation which concep-
tually misses the fact that the ‘transfer of powers’ as addressed by several national 
47 For an in-depth analysis see Mayer supra n. 8 at p. 87 et seq.; Wendel, supra n. 46 at 
p. 462 et seq.; M. Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart 2006)
p. 709 et seq.; H. Sauer, Jurisdiktionskonflikte in Mehrebenensystemen (Springer 2008) p. 179 et seq.;
M. Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict’, ELJ 11 (2005) p. 262, 264, 295 ff.
48 FCC, Case 2 BvR 255/69 Lütticke, order of 9 June 1971, BVerfGE 31, p. 145, 174.
49 FCC, Case 2 BvR 1107/77 et al., Eurocontrol I, order of 23 June 1981, BVerfGE 58, p. 1,
30 et seq.
50 FCC, Case 2 BvR 687/85 Kloppenburg, order of 8 April 1987, BVerfGE 75, p. 223, 235.
51 FCC Maastricht supra n. 44 at para. 106.
52 P. Kirchhof, ‘Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht’, in P. Kirch-
hof and C.D. Ehlermann (eds.), Europarecht Beiheft 1/1991, p. 11, 18. 
53 FCC Lisbon supra n. 45 at paras. 240 and 340. 
54 Ibid., para. 240.
55 Ibid., para. 241.
56 Ibid., para. 240.
57 Ibid., para. 234.
58 ECJ, Case Rs. 26/62 Van Gend & Loos, judgment of 5 Feb. 1963, paras. 9-10; ECJ, Case 
6/64 Costa/ENEL, judgment of 15 July 1964, paras. 8 et seq. As a classic cf. J.H.H. Weiler and 
U.R. Haltern, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order through the Looking Glass’, 
37 HILJ (1996), p. 411 et seq. 
59 Ibid., para. 231 and further also para. 301. Different approach still in FCC, Case BVerfGE 
22, 293, 296 EEC regulations and Case BVerfGE 31, 145, 173-174, Milk Powder.
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integration clauses is not a transferre, but instead a conferre.60 The German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court’s ultra vires review essentially aims to ensure that the 
exercise of public authority at EU level does not exceed the so-called ‘integration 
programme’ which has been consented to, in Germany, by an act of parliament. 
In Karlsruhe’s conception, the parliamentary statutes of approval to the Treaties 
are a bridge connecting national law with EU law – a bridge at the end of which 
stands a guardian: the Bundesverfassungsgericht.61 However, the substantial scope 
of a statute of approval can only be determined in relation to its point of reference: 
EU primary law. That is the reason why the ultra vires review cannot be conceptu-
ally limited to (directly or indirectly) scrutinizing the compatibility of EU law 
with national constitutional law, but necessarily extends to examining whether 
EU secondary law is in conformity with EU primary law.
This twofold review standard, with its roots deep in national constitutional law 
but with its branches stretching out into EU law, presents a fundamental concep-
tual problem,62 given that the Federal Constitutional Court is adjudicating in an 
area for which it is not competent, neither in a legal nor in a technical sense. Or 
to use another metaphor: the FCC looks at the European order of competences 
through the lens of national constitutional law, thus producing an image that is 
not necessarily congruent with the self-portrait of EU law. The more the Court 
extends its review competence on detailed questions of EU law, the higher the 
degree of distortion. Furthermore there is always the danger of methodological 
incoherence, particularly when a national constitutional court like the FCC cri-
tiques the Court of Justice for a certain way of interpretation (dynamic, teleo-
logical, broad etc.) which resembles the methods used by the national court itself 
when interpreting national constitutional law.63
How can the functionality of EU law be maintained within the framework of 
an ultra vires review on the basis of these premises? The FCC elaborated on this 
question in its Honeywell ruling.64 The Court emphasized the necessity to coor-
dinate the ultra vires review ‘with the task which the Treaties confer on the Court 
of Justice, namely to interpret and apply the Treaties, and in doing so to safeguard 
the unity and coherence of Union law’.65 In light of the principle of openness 
towards European law, the FCC specified the procedural and substantial conditions 
60 See already E. Kaufmann, in Institut für Staatslehre und Politik Mainz (Ed.), Der Kampf um 
den Wehrbeitrag (vol. II, 1953) p. 42, 55.
61 For this metaphor see Kirchhof, supra n. 52 at p. 15.
62 Compare F.C. Mayer, ‘Rebels without a Cause?’, GLJ (2014) p. 111, 117.
63 P. Craig, ‘The ECJ and Ultra Vires Action’, 48 CMLRev. (2011) p. 395, 405. 
64 FCC, Case 2 BvR 2661/06 Honeywell, order of 6 July 2010.
65 FCC Honeywell, supra n. 64 at para. 56. 
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for ultra vires review in several ways,66 thereby omitting any reference to the con-
cept of ‘sovereign statehood’ that had played a key role in the Lisbon judgment. 
In terms of procedure the FCC made it unambiguously clear that the Court 
of Justice must be given an ‘opportunity to interpret the Treaties, as well as to rule 
on the validity and interpretation of the legal acts in question’ before the FCC 
decides on the inapplicability of an act of EU law in Germany.67 Meeting this 
requirement is in and of itself doubtlessly a great achievement of the OMT refer-
ence. 
In terms of substance, according to Honeywell a double test applies: ultra vires 
review can only ‘be considered’ by the FCC if the act of EU law in question is 
firstly ‘manifestly in violation of competences’ and secondly structurally significant, 
i.e., ‘highly significant in the structure of competences between the Member States
and the Union with regard to the principle of conferral and to the binding nature
of the statute under the rule of law’.68 In this context the Federal Constitutional
Court did not only express respect for the Union’s own, idiosyncratic legal meth-
odology, but also granted the ECJ a ‘right to tolerance of error’.69 Judge Landau
criticized in his dissenting opinion that this restrictive concretization of ultra vires
review fell short of the judicial consent reached by the Second Senate in its Lisbon
judgment70; yet another example for the Lisbon judgment’s diversity of (and open-
ness to) interpretations.71
Even though the Federal Constitutional Court suggests that the OMT decision 
is in line with its Honeywell judgment,72 a closer look reveals several important 
deviations.
Extending ultra vires review to legal prohibitions
The first consists in the explicit extension of ultra vires review to compliance with 
legal prohibitions under EU primary law. By including an alleged violation of 
Article 123 TFEU in its OMT reference, the Second Senate extends ultra vires 
review to the question whether an act of an EU institution is in conformity with 
provisions of EU primary law – provisions which are categorically no legal bases 
in the strict sense of the word. This move is certainly not spectacular, given that a 
legal prohibition can always be reconstructed as a negative competence norm. The 
66 Cf. M. Payandeh, ‘Constitutional Review of EU Law after Honeywell’, 48 CMLRev. (2011) 
p. 9, 23 et seq.; H. Sauer, ‘Europas Richter Hand in Hand?’, EuZW (2011) p. 94, 95, 97; Classen,
JZ (2010), p. 1186.
67 FCC Honeywell supra n. 64 at para. 60. 
68 Ibid., at para. 61. 
69 Ibid., at para. 66.
70 Diss. opinion Landau zu BVerfGE 126, 286 (322) Rn. 102 – Honeywell. 
71 F.C. Mayer, ‘Rashomon in Karlsruhe’, NJW (2010) p. 714 ff.
72 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at paras. 24-26.
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danger that this leads to a path at the end of which stands a general EU legality 
review by the FCC could certainly be averted if the Honeywell double test was 
strictly applied.
Manifest violation of competences?
In the aftermath of the OMT reference it is questionable, however, if the Honey-
well test still applies in sensu stricto. With a view to potential redistributive effects 
on the one hand73 and the overall fiscal responsibility of the parliament on the 
other hand74 one could still agree with the FCC where it classifies the alleged vio-
lations as being of structural importance.75 
However, this is not true for the second criterion of the Honeywell test, i.e., the 
condition that the EU act in question must be in manifest violation of compe-
tences. Although the Second Senate formally holds on to this condition, its concrete 
application illustrates that substantially there is not much left of it.76 As indicated 
above, the restriction of ultra vires review to manifest violations of competences is 
meant to guarantee the functionality and unity of EU law. This requirement would 
be met if one conceived of manifest violations as merely those which are ‘obvious 
from the outset and which suggest themselves without further legal analysis’, as 
Judge Gerhardt submits in his dissenting opinion.77 Certainly, the claim that a 
violation is manifest cannot be disproved by the mere fact that a counterargument 
can theoretically be formulated. Legal questions are always debatable, also (and 
not rarely so) on the basis of odd legal positions. Meanwhile, a qualification like 
‘evident’ or ‘manifest’ demands an increased degree of persuasiveness. Hence, in 
order to establish a manifest violation of competences, adequate reasons would 
have to be provided why the assumption of a breach of competences is clearly 
preferable to any other legal position defended. This standard is – inversely – used 
by the FCC in order to establish whether ordinary or specialized courts have ar-
bitrarily violated German constitutional law by not referring a preliminary ques-
tion to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg.78 
73 Ibid., paras. 40-41.
74 Ibid., paras. 43-44.
75 Critical, however, J. Bast, ‘Don’t Act beyond Your Powers’, 15 GJL (2014) p. 167, 179-180.
76 For similar conclusions, see W. Heun, ‘Eine verfassungswidrige Verfassungs gerichts ent schei-
dung’, JZ (2014) p. 331, 332 and A. Thiele, ‘Friendly or Unfriendly Act?’, 15 GJL (2014) p. 242, 
254 et seq.
77 Diss. opinion Gerhardt, FCC, Case 2 BvR 2728/13 et al., OMT, order of 14 Jan. 2014, 
para. 16.
78 FCC, Case 2 BvL 12, 13/88 Absatzfonds, 31 May 1990, para. 137. Accordingly, an ordinary 
or specialized court of last instance violates the right to a lawful judge arbitrarily (Art. 101(1), 
second sentence, GG) ‘when possible counterarguments are clearly preferable to the opinion held 
by the court on the relevant question’ of EU law. Note: the jurisprudence of both senates of the 
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The Federal Constitutional Court’s line of argument in its OMT reference, 
however, does not and could not possibly generate such an elevated degree of 
persuasiveness. After all, the FCC’s legal assessment is based on premises of EU 
law that are, as we will see, highly questionable, and in any case not obviously 
preferable to other legal positions. 
While leaving little doubt that it considers the OMT programme both a breach 
of the mandate of the ECB as well as a forbidden circumvention of Article 123 
TFEU, the majority of the Second Senate explicitly states that this assessment is 
‘subject to the interpretation by the Court of Justice’.79 This makes it all the more 
astounding that the FCC establishes the manifest character of a – so far only 
hypothetical – violation of Article 123 TFEU in a single sentence:
The violation would be manifest because the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union stipulates an explicit prohibition of monetary financing of the 
budget and the Treaty thus unequivocally excludes such powers of the European 
Central Bank (cf. Article 123(1) TFEU).80 
From the apodictic assumption that Article 123 TFEU ‘unequivocally excludes 
such powers’, the Second Senate’s majority concludes that a violation – in case 
there was one – would also be manifest. First of all, Article 123 TFEU is not, as 
we will see, as unequivocal as the Court suggests. Second, if the truth of the im-
plication’s antecedent (‘OMT is monetary financing’) is only established after a 
process of investigation that might have produced a different result, then to con-
clude, nonetheless, that the consequence (‘OMT is ultra vires’) is manifestly true 
is very strained logic.
Furthermore, the majority of the Second Senate insists on there having been a 
manifest violation, it at the same time suggests that ‘concerns regarding the valid-
ity of the OMT Decision (…) could be met by an interpretation in conformity 
with Union law’.81 But if we assume that an act could be regarded as being in 
conformity with EU law by means of interpretation, how could this very act si-
multaneously be regarded as manifestly violating EU competences?82 The two 
dissenting opinions are more convincing in this respect. In the view of Judges 
Lübbe-Wolff and Gerhardt, the constitutional complaints as well as the applica-
tions in the inter-institutional proceeding should have been rejected as inadmis-
FCC is not coherent in this respect, see FCC Honeywell, supra n. 64 at para. 89. For more details 
cf. the controversy between Fastenrath and Michael in JZ (2012) p. 870 et seq. and JZ (2013) 
p. 299 et seq. and 203 et seq.
79 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 55.
80 Ibid., para. 43.
81 Ibid., para. 99.
82 See I. Pernice, Verfassungsblog of 10 Feb. 2014.
277Exceeding Judicial Competence in the Name of Democracy
sible. If the Court had so decided, however, the preliminary questions would have 
definitely been irrelevant under Article 267 TFEU. The majority of the Second 
Senate obviously wanted to prevent such a result.
The Federal Constitutional Court thus comes to the paradoxical result of ask-
ing the Court of Justice whether or not the OMT programme violates EU law, 
while claiming at the same time that the violation, if established, would necessar-
ily have to be considered manifest.83 In other words, in order to even be entitled 
to ask whether there is a violation, the FCC already has to qualify it as such.84
The fact that the Federal Constitutional Court considers OMT to be in viola-
tion of the Treaties ‘subject to the interpretation of the Court of Justice’85 can, 
on the other hand, not only be understood as an (offensive) invitation to the ECJ 
to restrict the implications of the OMT programme by means of interpretation. 
On the basis of this section the FCC could, in its final judgment, also accept the 
ECJ’s finding in a spirit of cooperation even in case that Luxembourg does not 
follow the interpretation of Karlsruhe – at least as far as the latter does not carry 
out an identity review. 
Extraordinary legal protection under extraordinary circumstances?
With its OMT reference, the Second Senate acknowledges for the first time a 
‘principal ultra vires objection’,86 be it within the procedural framework of an 
inter-institutional proceeding87 or a constitutional complaint.88 The admissibility 
of a constitutional complaint thus neither depends on a link between the ultra 
vires objection and the claimant’s principal claim that a substantial fundamental 
right has been violated (as was the case in Honeywell),89 nor on the claim that the 
essence of the right to vote – protected by the eternity clause in Article 79(3) GG 
– has been violated by an ultra vires act. According to the Second Senate,
citizens who are entitled to vote generally have a right, deriving from [the right to
vote], to have a transfer of sovereign powers only take place in the ways envisaged
in [the German integration clause in combination with the stipulation demanding
83 Ibid.
84 This is particularly due to the fact that the Federal Constitutional Court acknowledges, for
the first time, a principal ultra vires objection, see infra.
85 Supra n. 79.
86 Aptly K. Schneider, ‘Yes, But…One More Thing: Karlsruhe’s Ruling on the European 
Stability Mechanism’, 13 GLJ (2012) p. 53, 57 and id., ‘Questions and Answers’, 15 GLJ (2014) 
p. 218, 222.
87 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 54.
88 Ibid., at paras. 51-53.
89 The question was if a specialized court violated the fundamental rights of an individual
because it had aligned its jurisprudence to the ECJ’s Mangold judgment which was considered by 
some observers to be ultra vires.
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a two thirds majority for constitutional amendments]. The democratic decision-
making process, which these regulations guarantee in addition to the necessary 
specificity of the transfer of sovereign powers (…), is undermined when there is a 
unilateral usurpation of powers by institutions and other agencies of the European 
Union.90 
This is a paradigm shift. The right to vote henceforth entitles the voter to demand 
compliance with the procedural conditions of the EU-specific provisions of the 
German Basic Law as far as he or she claims the existence of an ultra vires act. In 
the numerous precedents relating to European integration, the right to vote could, 
however, only be invoked in case that the complainants plausibly demonstrated 
that by transferring competences or authorizing financial commitments, the Bun-
destag would lose its continuous and decisive say in fields which the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht considers to be essential for shaping the political development in 
Germany. This standard of review was intrinsically linked with the very essence of 
the principle of democracy as protected by the so-called ‘eternity clause’ even 
against constitutional revision (Article 79(3) GG).91 This link has now been dis-
solved.92 
The new expansion of the review competences of the Federal Constitutional 
Court proves early critics right.93 When the Court explicitly confirmed94 its 
jurisprudence on the right to vote in 2011 with reference to the ample and sub-
stantive criticism in the literature, it did so precisely by referring to this unchange-
able essence of the principle of democracy. If the parliament gave up key elements 
of political self-determination and thus permanently deprived citizens of their 
democratic possibilities of influence, the citizen’s claim to democracy, ‘ultimately 
rooted in human dignity’ would lapse.95 The Court stated in a rather clear-cut 
manner:
Citizens must be able to defend themselves in a constitutional court against a relin-
quishment of competences that is incompatible with Article 79(3) of the Basic Law. 
The Basic Law provides for no more extensive right of challenge. (…) The defensive 
90 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 53.
91 FCC Maastricht, supra n. 44 at paras. 62-63; FCC Lisbon, supra n. 45 at paras. 175, 211, 216 
ff., 245 ff.; FCC Greece & EFSF, supra n. 11 at para. 101; FCC ESM & TSCG (summary review), 
supra n. 21 at para. 208 [EN 2014].
92 A first indication may retrospectively already be identified FCC Lisbon, supra n. 45 at para. 
247. However, this does not predetermine the procedural conclusions drawn in the OMT reference.
93 See notably B. von Tomuschat, ‘Die Europäische Union unter der Aufsicht des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts’, EuGRZ (1993) p. 489 et seq. and D. König, ‘Das Urteil des Bundesverfassungs-
gerichts zum Vertrag von Maastricht’, 54 ZaöRV (1994) p. 17, 27-28. 
94 FCC Greece & EFSF, supra n. 11 at paras. 101-102. 
95 Ibid., at para. 101.
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dimension of Article 38(1) of the Basic Law therefore takes effect in configurations 
in which the danger clearly exists that the competences of the present or future 
Bundestag will be eroded in a manner that legally or de facto makes parliamentary 
representation of the popular will, directed to the realisation of the political will of 
the citizens, impossible. The entitlement to make an application is therefore only 
granted if there is a substantiated submission that the right to vote may be eroded.96
The preliminary reference does not, however, provide due justification for why the 
Court should depart from this line in its case-law now. This weighs all the more 
heavily, given that this new approach potentially opens the door, as dissenting 
Judge Gerhardt rightly emphasizes, ‘to a general right to have the laws enforced 
(allgemeiner Gesetzesvollziehungsanspruch)’,97 a concept that has explicitly been 
rejected by the FCC.98 Taking the OMT reference at face value, any person eli-
gible to vote could now challenge various actions by EU institutions before the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, not least because an effective limitation of 
the actio popularis is lacking also with regard to the condition of manifestness.99 
It is hard to imagine that this is actually what the Court had in mind. The refer-
ence itself presents the central counterargument: the right to vote ‘does not serve 
to monitor the content of democratic processes, but is intended to facilitate 
them’.100 
Do extraordinary circumstances justify extraordinary legal remedies then? In 
the absence of substantive arguments it remains open to speculation why the FCC 
deemed it necessary to depart from its previous case-law. Meanwhile the dissent-
ing opinion of Judge Gerhardt proves to be illuminating in this respect. It provides 
a critical insider’s perspective on the reasoning and the motives of the majority of 
the Second Senate. According to Judge Gerhardt, the majority within the Senate 
essentially intended 
to deal with the particular situation that the European Central bank has sufficient 
democratic legitimation only for its core obligations (...) and that therefore, if it acts 
outside this area, this happens without connection to the democratic formation of 
opinions; the Senate holds that the curtailment of the citizen’s right to democratic 
participation comes close to a violation of identity, and it must therefore be possible 
to be countered by the citizens with the help of the Federal Constitutional Court; 
according to the Senate, it cannot be conveyed to the citizens that given such a 
96 Ibid., at paras. 101-102, emphasis added.
97 Diss. opinion Gerhardt, supra n. 77 at para. 6. Critically also Mayer, supra n. 62 at p. 136; 
Heun, supra n. 76, p. 332; Schneider, supra n. 86, p. 222-223.
98 FCC ESM & TSCG (summary review), supra n. 21 at para. 199 [EN 2014], confirmed in 
FCC ESM & TSCG (principal proceedings), supra n. 28 at para. 130.
99 Compare in this sense also diss. opinion Gerhardt, supra n. 77 at para. 7.
100 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 52 as well as previously para. 19.
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democratic deficit, and with a view to the possible significance of the OMT Deci-
sion, there is no legal protection.101 
The majority’s apparent assumption that citizens would have to be granted legal 
protection in the face of a dramatic democratic deficit at EU level (‘since nobody 
else is around’) is, however, not convincing on several accounts.
S e n t e n c e d  t o  d e b a t e
According to the Federal Constitutional Court, acts of EU institutions are subject 
to ultra vires review only ‘insofar as these acts provide the basis of actions taken 
by German authorities’.102 In its decision of 2011, the Court rejected as inadmis-
sible the constitutional complaints directed against the purchases of government 
bonds by the ECB within the framework of its SMP programme. These acts were 
no sovereign acts of German public authority and could therefore, according to 
the Court, not be challenged by the complainants –‘notwithstanding other pos-
sibilities of review’.103 
Taking responsibility for integration by means of an open-ended debate? 
But how did the Court arrive at the conclusion that constitutional complaints 
against real purchases of government bonds by the ECB within the framework of 
SMP are inadmissible, whereas constitutional complaints against the mere an-
nouncement to buy government bonds within the framework of OMT are admis-
sible? Firstly, unlike the decision of 2011, the OMT case is also based on 
inter-institutional proceedings and not only constitutional complaints. Secondly, 
and more importantly, the Court (re)interprets the applications in the sense that 
they are also directed against the inactivity of German state institutions.104 Hence, 
the OMT programme is, technically speaking, indirectly subject to review.105 In 
other words, in the eyes of the Court the applications are directed both against 
the participation of the German Federal Central Bank (Bundesbank) in a potential 
(but unlikely) implementation of the OMT programme, but also against an un-
101 Diss. opinion Gerhardt, supra n. 77 at para. 10.
102 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 23. 
103 FCC Greece & EFSF, supra n. 11 at para. 116 with reference to Maastricht and Honeywell. 
Critically on that M. Nettesheim, ‘Euro-Rettung und Grundgesetz’, EuR (2011) p. 765, 770; 
Thym, JZ (2011), p. 1011.
104 See the critique of diss. opinion Lübbe-Wolff, supra n. 1 at paras. 2 and 22.
105 Cf. D. Murswiek, ‘ECB, ECJ, Democracy, and the Constitutional Court’, 15 GLJ (2014) 
p. 147, 156-157.
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constitutional inactivity of the parliament and government.106 In the words of the 
FCC ‘the German Bundestag and the Federal Government may not simply let a 
manifest or structurally significant usurpation of sovereign powers by European 
Union organs take place.’107 A citizen could ‘therefore demand that the Bundestag 
and the Federal Government actively deal with the question of how the distribution 
of powers entailed in the treaties can be restored, and that they decide which op-
tions they want to use to pursue this goal’.108 
As both dissenting opinions point out, this is a highly questionable approach 
from a constitutional law perspective. It ultimately leads to the situation that the 
Bundestag is sentenced to debate by the Bundesverfassungsgericht.109 The responsi-
bility for integration110 by means of parliamentary consent is thus joined by a hazy 
responsibility for integration by means of an open-ended debate.
Lack of legal determination
The first objection in this respect relates to the lack of legal determination. In the 
present context the (political) reactions to the alleged ultra vires act cannot suffi-
ciently be defined in legal terms,111 as demonstrated by the following question: 
what would happen if the Federal Constitutional Court actually considered the 
OMT programme to be ultra vires in its final judgment? The Court could pro-
hibit the Bundesbank from participating in a future implementation of the OMT 
programme,112 which would be a rather ineffective way of preventing the alleged 
ultra vires act.113 However, the Court would not be able to sufficiently determine 
in terms of constitutional law how parliament and government should ‘deal’ with 
the alleged breach of competences.114 Not surprisingly, the Court’s statements in 
this respect are rather vague. In case that the alleged transgression of compe-
106 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at paras. 1 and 45 et seq. In FCC Greece & EFSF, supra n. 11 at paras. 
114-116 even acts of active participation were regarded as not being challengeable.
107 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 46, emphasis added.
108 Ibid., at para. 53, emphasis added.
109 Diss. opinion Lübbe-Wolff, supra n. 1 at para. 22.
110 For a detailed assessment of this concept, see U. Hufeld, in Andreas von Arnauld and Ulrich
Hufeld (eds.), Systematischer Kommentar zu den Lissabon-Begleitgesetzen (2011) p. 25, 33-35. 
111 This is the core argument of diss. opinion opinion Lübbe-Wolff, supra n. 1 at paras. 12-27.
112 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 45.
113 The Bundesbank alone would not be able to prevent the implementation in the ECB’s 
Governing Council (the Bundesbank’s president had voted against OMT anyway). Furthermore it 
is questionable whether the Bundesbank would actually comply with such a judgment of the FCC, 
given the Bundesbank’s independence vis-à-vis domestic institutions under Art. 130 para. 1 TFEU. 
If the FCC prohibited participation in the implementation of the OMT program, the Bundesbank 
would thus be faced with a conflict of laws, cf. Mayer, supra n. 62 at p. 127 et seq. and Thiele, supra 
n. 76 at p. 249.
114 In detail diss. opinion Lübbe-Wolff, supra n. 1 at paras. 12-27.
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tences could not be legitimated ex post by means of a treaty revision and a domes-
tic statute of approval (within the limits of the eternity clause), the Bundestag and 
the federal government would be obliged to take either ‘legal or political means’ 
towards an annulment of the ultra vires act or ‘adequate precautions’ towards a 
minimization of domestic effects should the ultra vires act endure. This is as con-
crete as it gets.
Can there be a justiciable individual right to demand an open-ended debate in 
parliament or to request more or less ineffective actions by state organs? It is far 
from surprising that the Second Senate acts in contradiction to its previous case-
law115 when it recognizes such a ‘claim on the merits’ (Tätigwerden dem Grunde 
nach).116 Until now, constitutional complaints directed against the inactivity of 
state organs were only admissible when the omitted act could be adequately spec-
ified.117 In case of OMT, however, the selection and specification of different 
courses of action lies within the discretionary power of parliament and government, 
a fact that has to be accepted by citizens and the Federal Constitutional Court 
alike.118
In the name of democracy?
The second principal objection relates to the circumvention of the democratic 
process. The fact that an individual voter shall be entitled to demand a more or 
less unspecified action by the parliament with the help of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court and on the basis of his or her right to vote alone (i.e., beyond the 
means provided in the constitution, such as a petition) is incompatible with the 
principle of representative democracy under German constitutional law.119 
Judge Gerhardt’s dissenting opinion suggests that the majority within the Sec-
ond Senate was ultimately concerned with ensuring the ‘public nature of the 
parliamentary process’.120 This observation, made from a critical internal perspec-
tive, matches with the outsider’s impression: the German Federal Constitutional 
Court’s jurisprudence on European integration seems also to be an attempt to give 
the floor to political positions that might otherwise remain underrepresented due 
to a rather strong culture of consensus among the major political parties in Ger-
115 Diss. opinion Lübbe-Wolff, supra n. 1 at para. 18.
116 Diss. opinion Gerhardt, supra n. 77 at para. 19.
117 In particular FCC Greece & EFSF, supra n. 11 at para. 118: ‘An omission on the part of 
the legislature may be the subject of a constitutional complaint if the complainant can rely on an 
express mandate of the Basic Law which essentially defines the content and scope of the duty to 
legislate.’ For more references see opinion Lübbe-Wolff, supra n. 1 at para. 18.
118 Diss. opinion Gerhardt, supra n. 77 at paras. 11, 15, 18 as well as diss. opinion Lübbe-Wolff, 
supra n. 1 at para. 12.
119 Diss. opinion Gerhardt, supra n. 77 at para. 21.
120 Ibid., para. 20.
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many with regard to EU affairs. Seen in this light, the EU related case-law of the 
Court aims to take the discussion (back) into the pluralistic ‘publicness’ of the 
parliament, which bears the responsibility for integration. Ultimately, the Court 
might even bring in the constituting power of ‘the people’ to decide on a new 
constitution.121
As a matter of fact, the Court’s approach goes beyond the mere aim of securing 
the public nature of the parliamentary process. Rather, the courtroom in Karlsruhe 
itself becomes a substitute (or competitor) for the political arena. In the aca-
demic writings of a present member of the Second Senate this function of the 
case-law is referred to as a specific mode of ‘democratic compensation or valve’.122 
Some scholars even conceive of the actio popularis before the FCC as a ‘constitu-
tional-complaint-plebiscite’, i.e., as a functional surrogate for the lack of direct 
democracy at the federal level in Germany.123 Seen from this angle, the rather 
increased willingness of the Bundesverfassungsgericht to adjudicate in questions of 
European integration presents itself as an attempt to ‘de-elitify’ Europe and bring 
it closer to the citizen. 
However, it may be doubted whether a constitutional court is capable of doing 
so, both institutionally and structurally. Decision-making within the Federal Con-
stitutional Court depends on legal deliberations based on reason within a panel 
of eight judges (admittedly elitist in its own way), not on a majority decision of 
the elected representatives of the people or the people themselves on the basis of 
political opinions developed in a pluralistic society. Interests that are defended in 
a courtroom have to be defended according to legal categories and therefore do 
not necessarily reflect political antagonisms. 
There are also objections relating to the normative foundation of the ‘surrogate 
claim’ as well as the apparently underlying theory of democracy. How can the 
deliberate absence of plebiscitary elements in the constitution be construed as a 
deficit without applying a normative standard beyond this constitution?124 Can 
such a standard provide a sufficient normative foundation for a constitutional court 
to introduce an actio popularis which can ultimately turn out to have an anti-
parliamentarian tendency? Does the political consensus amongst the leading po-
121 However, not in case of OMT. For the scenario of a new constitution see FCC Lisbon, supra 
n. 45 at paras. 179 and 263. For an in-depth assessment of the problem, cf. M. Nettesheim, ‘Wo
„endet“ das Grundgesetz?’, 51 Der Staat (2012) p. 313, 337 et seq.
122 P.M. Huber, in H. von Mangoldt et al. (eds.), GG Kommentar, 6th edn (2010) Art. 19 IV 
GG, para. 350: ‘demokratiespezifische Ventil- oder Kompensationsfunktion’. 
123 W. Kahl, ‘Bewältigung der Staatsschuldenkrise unter Kontrolle des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’, 
DVBl. (2013) p. 197, 207.
124 Accordingly, Kahl, supra n. 123 at p. 207 does not refer to the Basic Law but to its personal 
estimation that the absence of plebiscitary elements is no longer seasonable, especially as regards 
fundamental questions of European integration.
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litical parties in Germany on the ‘big questions’ of EU policy really amount to a 
democratic deficit? Would such a deficit be resolved if there were more Euroscep-
tic MPs in the Bundestag? Has the EU become more democratic on 25 May 2014 
because a larger number of Eurosceptic MEPs have been elected?
The Court cannot possibly have meant this either. But if this is so and specific 
constitutional standards are not available, the alleged ‘inactivity’ of the Bundestag 
and federal government has to be accepted as an expression of a democratic major-
ity decision. As Judge Gerhardt aptly put it:
If (…) the Federal Government approves the OMT programme and makes it one 
of the foundations of its own acts, and if the German Bundestag accepts all this with 
open eyes – against the backdrop of an intensive public debate, after having heard 
the President of the European Central Bank, and, according to the information 
provided by a member of the Budget Committee in the oral hearing, on the basis of 
the Bundestag’s observation and assessment of the acts of the European Central Bank 
– this is the exercise of its democratic responsibility. The Bundestag could readily have
criticised the OMT Decision by political means, threatened, if necessary, to bring
proceedings for annulment before the Court of Justice of the European Union,
waited for the reactions of the European Central Bank and the financial markets and
then taken further steps. The fact that it did none of this does not indicate a demo-
cratic deficit, but is an expression of its majority decision for a certain policy when
handling the sovereign debt crisis in the euro currency area.125
Finally, questions arise as to how far the FCC’s decisions can be considered le-
gitimate from an overall European perspective, given their potential external effects. 
In the words of Judge Lübbe-Wolff:
That some few independent German judges – invoking the German interpretation 
of the principle of democracy, the limits of admissible competences of the ECB fol-
lowing from this interpretation, and our reading of Art. 123 et seq. TFEU – make 
a decision with incalculable consequences for the operating currency of the euro 
zone and the national economies depending on it appears as an anomaly of question-
able democratic character.126
I d e n t i t y  r e v i e w :  t w o  i d e n t i t i e s ?
The OMT reference also contains several important remarks on the modalities of 
the so-called identity review. For the time period following the decision of the 
ECJ, the Federal Constitutional Court reserves the right to review whether the 
125 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 23, emphasis added.
126 Diss. opinion Lübbe-Wolff, supra n. 1 at para. 18.
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OMT programme – in its interpretation by the ECJ – violates the identity of the 
constitution as protected by Article 79(3) GG.127
In its judgment of 7 September 2011, the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that 
the essence of the principle of democracy as part of the constitutional identity 
would be violated if the Bundestag relinquished its ‘parliamentary budget respon-
sibility’ by giving up the capability to decide on the budget on its own terms.128 
According to the Court, ‘no permanent mechanisms may be created under inter-
national treaties which are tantamount to accepting liability for decisions by free 
will of other states, above all if they entail consequences which are hard to 
calculate’.129 While the Court states that it is not foreseeable at present whether 
the budgetary autonomy of the German parliament could be affected by possible 
losses inflicted on the Bundesbank by the OMT programme,130 it claims a right 
to review in two respects: an identity review of the OMT programme in its en-
tirety on the basis of an interpretation by the ECJ on the one hand131 and a pos-
sible future identity review of single implementation measures on the other hand.132 
As regards the second scenario, the Court announced that it would carry out 
the identity review(s) without submitting a further preliminary question to the 
ECJ.133 From the Federal Constitutional Court’s point of view, the ‘relationship 
of cooperation’ between Luxembourg and Karlsruhe finds expression in the fol-
lowing separation of judicial tasks: while it is for the ECJ to interpret the legal 
measures taken at EU level, it rests with the FCC to determine what German 
constitutional identity requires and whether it has been violated.134 According to 
this train of thought, submitting preliminary questions to the ECJ on implemen-
tation measures would not be necessary since the ECJ would have already taken 
its decision on the interpretation of the OMT Decision in its entirety.
The absence of a further reference does not cause a major problem for the 
Federal Constitutional Court, given that it highlights the differences between the 
protection of national (constitutional) identity at the national and at EU level. 
Whereas in the context of the Lisbon judgment the Court still emphasized that 
national constitutional and European legal protection of national constitutional 
127 The legal consequences of such a decision, i.e., the declaration that the OMT programme 
must not produce legal consequences for any German state organ, would also be rather inefficient. 
128 FCC Greece & EFSF, supra n. 11 at paras. 120 et seq.
129 Ibid., at para. 128 as well as FCC ESM & TSCG (summary review), supra n. 21 at para. 214 
[EN 2014], both judgments referred to by FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at paras. 28, 102.
130 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 102.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid., para. 103.
133 For further criticism see Mayer, supra n. 62 at p. 131.
134 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 27.
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identity ‘go hand-in-hand in the European legal area’,135 it now draws a clear 
conceptual distinction between the notion of constitutional identity under Article 
79(3) GG and the notion of national (constitutional) identity under Article 4(2), 
first sentence, TEU. The scope of the latter would not only be broader than the 
core protected by the former, as demonstrated exemplarily by the Sayn-Wittgenstein 
decision.136 According to the FCC, the two concepts also differ ‘fundamentally’: 
while the protection of identity under EU law is relative and can be subjected to 
for instance a proportionality review, the very essence of the principles protected 
under Article 79(3) GG must not be weighed up against other principles 
(Abwägungsfestigkeit).137 In other words, the FCC deems the protection of na-
tional identity provided by the Court of Justice inadequate in terms of national 
constitutional law. Two types of identity, two types of review.
However, this does not yet make obtaining a preliminary ruling from the ECJ 
superfluous.138 Certainly, the EU’s obligation to respect the national identities, 
inherent in their fundamental political and constitutional structures (Article 4(2), 
first sentence TEU) cannot mean that legal interests linked to national identities 
automatically take precedence over legal interests protected by EU law. Otherwise 
EU law would potentially be subject to 28 identity caveats. But still Article 4(2), 
first sentence, TEU is a legal mechanism by means of which EU law is made 
permeable to certain principles of national constitutional law.139 Although con-
ceptually obscure140 and subject to considerable differences from one country to 
another,141 the term ‘identity’ as referred to in Article 4(2), first sentence, TEU 
connects EU law with national constitutional law, a fact not least mirrored by 
several constitutional courts that have picked up on this term in their EU related 
case-law.142 
135 FCC Lisbon, supra n. 45 at para. 240. This ultimately refers to the idea that Art. 4(2), first 
sentence, TEU only declaratively mirrors the national constitutional foundation of EU law and the 
right of member states to unilaterally derogate from it in exceptional cases.
136 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 29 in reference to ECJ, Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein, 
judgment of 22 Oct. 2010.
137 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 29.
138 See also M. Kumm, ‘Rebel Without a Good Cause’, 15 GLJ (2014) p. 203, 209-210.
139 More specifically Wendel, supra n. 46 at p. 572 et seq.
140 Compare already A. von Bogdandy, ‘Europäische und nationale Identität: Integration durch 
Verfassungsrecht?’, 62 VVDStRL (2003) p. 156, 164.
141 J.H. Reestman, ‘The Franco-German Constitutional Divide’, 5 EuConst (2009) p. 374 et 
seq.; M. Walter, ‘Integrationsgrenze Verfassungsidentität’, 72 ZaöRV (2012) p. 177, 179 et seq., 
both with specific regard to France and Germany.
142 French Conseil constitutionnel, Case 2004-505 DC Constitutional Treaty, decision of 
19 Nov. 2004, para. 13 and Case 2006-540 DC Information society, decision of 27 July 2006, 
para. 19; Spanish Constitutional Tribunal, Case no. 1/2004 Constitutional Treaty, decision of 
13 Dec. 2004; Czech Constitutional Court, Case Pl ÚS 19/08 Treaty of Lisbon I, judgment of 
26. Nov. 2008, para. 120 and Case Pl. ÚS 29/09 Treaty of Lisbon II, judgment of 3. Nov. 2009,
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An appropriate protection of national constitutional identity at EU level aims 
to safeguard diversity and thus presumes an autonomous definition of constitu-
tional identity at the national level.143 This is why national constitutional courts 
can play a key role in the protection of national identity under EU law, as far as 
they are called upon to specify what ‘constitutional identity’ means, respectively.144 
While EU law refers back to national law with regard to the substance of consti-
tutional identity, it nevertheless regulates the legal consequences of the ‘identity 
argument’ under EU law. In other words, while national bodies, in particular 
constitutional courts, may concretize what falls under the term of constitutional 
identity, the Court of Justice decides to what extent the obligation to protect 
national constitutional identity prevails over (hypothetically) conflicting principles 
of EU law. Accordingly Article 4(2) first sentence, TEU can be understood as an 
auto-limitative mechanism by means of which EU law revokes – to some, and 
certainly not to an unlimited, extent – its own claim to primacy within its scope 
of application.145 
Until today the ECJ has been particularly sensitive to concerns raised in this 
respect at the national constitutional level. This is especially true with regard to 
the concept of human dignity as defended particularly in Germany.146 The fact 
that constitutional assets such as the abolition of the nobility or the protection of 
a national official language have not only been considered legitimate interests but 
ultimately to outweigh other interests under EU law,147 also speaks for and not 
against the effectiveness of the identity review at EU level. This remedy must 
therefore be exhausted before taking any other measures that might end up ques-
tioning the uniform application of EU law. 
para. 150; Latvian Constitutional Court, Case 2008-35-01 Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 7 April 
2009, part 16.3; Hungarian Constitutional Court, Case 143/2010 Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 
12 July 2010, part III.1; Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Case K 32/09 Treaty of Lisbon, judgment 
of 24 Nov. 2010, part III.2.1, III.3.8.
143 Wendel, supra n. 46 at p. 573-575 and 579-581.
144 Within the boundaries of the separation of powers at domestic level.
145 Compare F. Mayer, ‘Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit’, in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), 
Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, 2nd edn (2009) p. 559, 588-589 as well as, in detail, A. von Bogdandy 
and S. Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon 
Treaty’, 48 CMLRev. (2011) p. 1417, 1432. For a stronger accentuation of the ECJ’s authority 
of interpretation regarding the notion of national identity, however, see M. Claes, ‘Negotiating 
Constitutional Identity or Whose Identity Is It Anyway?’, in D. Anagnostou and M. Claes et al. 
(eds.), Constitutional Conversations in Europe (Cambridge, 2012) p. 205, 207 et seq. Accentuating 
the ordinary function of the identity clause B. Gustaferro, ‘Beyond the Exceptionalism of 
Constitutional Conflicts’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/12, p. 34 et seq.
146 ECJ, Case C-36/02 Omega, judgment of 14 Oct. 2004, paras. 32 et seq. This judgment 
cannot be understood in a way that the ECJ would generally weigh up human dignity against the 
free movement of services.
147 ECJ, Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein, judgment of 22 Dec. 2010, paras. 83 ff., as well as 
ECJ, Case C-391/09 Runevič-Vardyn, judgment of 12 May 2011, paras. 86 et seq.
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To sum up, in case of an alleged violation of national identity, the ECJ has to 
be granted the opportunity to assess whether the issue at hand is compatible with 
Article 4(2), first sentence, TEU. This not only flows from the principle of loy-
alty under EU law (Article 4(3) TEU) but also from the principle of openness 
towards European law under national (here: German) constitutional law. Domes-
tic identity review should, if at all, only become an option of last resort in case of 
a lack of protection at EU level. Even in case a future implementation of the OMT 
programme would violate Germany’s constitutional identity, which currently seems 
unimaginable in any case (after all the FCC itself leaves this question open, and 
for good reason), the Federal Constitutional Court would still have to submit a 
preliminary reference to the Court of Justice.148 
EU law perspective and Luxembourg’s range of options 
The preliminary reference also raises several critical questions in terms of EU law.
Pr o c e d u ra l  q u e s t i o n s
There are already doubts as to whether the preliminary reference is admissible.
Subject of reference
Can a decision that was communicated via press release only149 and that merely 
prescribes a rather abstract framework for a hypothetical purchase of government 
bonds be subject to a preliminary ruling? Following the ECJ’s case-law, one might 
still suppose that it could. Article 267(1)(b) TFEU generally applies to ‘acts of the 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union’ and is kept deliberately broad 
compared to other provisions, e.g. Article 263(1), first sentence, TFEU. Further-
more, in order to fall within the scope of application of Article 267(1)(b) TFEU, 
acts neither have to be legally binding nor directly applicable according to the 
ECJ’s case-law.150 Only if one were inclined to follow the argument according to 
which Article 267(1)(b) TFEU would not cover mere preparatory measures,151 
148 The ECJ may already comment on Art. 4(2), first sentence, TEU within the framework of 
the pending legal proceedings. However, a statement would necessarily remain vague due to the 
lack of any concrete implementation of the OMT programme so far.
149 There is no other written account of this decision, compare supra n. 3.
150 ECJ, Case C-322/88 Grimaldi, judgment of 13 Dec. 1989, para. 8: ‘without exception’. 
Previously, at least implicitly, ECJ, Case 9/73 Schlüter, judgment of 8 Oct. 1973, paras. 38, 40 
(decision by the Council), as well as Case 113/75 Frecassetti, judgment of 15 June 1976, paras. 8-9 
(recommendation by the Commission). 
151 See B.W. Wegener, in Ch. Calliess and M. Ruffert (eds.), EUV/AEUV, 4th edn (2011), 
Art. 267 TFEU, para. 9 and M. Pechstein, EU-Prozessrecht, 4th edn (2011), para. 772.
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the OMT programme would appear to be an inappropriate subject for a prelimi-
nary decision. However, the ECJ’s case-law suggests that Luxembourg will not 
exclude preparatory measures as such. Besides, the Federal Constitutional Court 
saw the (potential) problem and formulated an alternative set of questions which 
addresses the interpretation of the relevant primary law in an abstract way in order 
to meet the conditions of Article 267(1)(a) TFEU on all accounts.152 In the eyes 
of the FCC, such abstract interpretation by the ECJ would also be necessary for 
the case at hand because the FCC considers itself obliged to provide interim legal 
protection.153
Necessity and prohibition of functional misuse
However, it is highly questionable that the preliminary questions can be considered 
‘necessary’ in the sense of Article 267(1) TFEU and that they do not end up being 
a forbidden misuse of the preliminary reference procedure. Certainly, the case-law 
of the ECJ leaves a wide margin of discretion for domestic courts in order to de-
termine whether or not the interpretation of EU law is necessary for the national 
case at hand.154 There is a general presumption of necessity that can only be rebut-
ted in exceptional cases,155 in particular 
where it is quite obvious that the interpretation which is sought of the provisions of 
Union law referred to in the questions bears no relation to the actual facts of the 
main action or to its purpose or where the problem is hypothetical or the Court does 
not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to 
the questions submitted to it.156 
The ECJ has been very cautious in affirming such exceptional cases,157 as also 
demonstrated in Pringle, even though some of the questions submitted by the Irish 
Supreme Court were rejected as inadmissible.158 
While the ECJ’s jurisprudence clearly does not aim to declare preliminary 
questions inadmissible only because of procedural peculiarities at the national 
152 FCC OMT, supra n. 2, set of questions 2.
153 Ibid., para. 101.
154 For the first time rudimentary in ECJ, Case 83/78 Pigs Marketing Board, judgment of 
29 Nov. 1978, para. 25. With reference to a national constitutional court ECJ, Case C-399/11 
Melloni, judgment of 26 Feb. 2013, paras. 28-29. 
155 Classic ECJ, Case 244/80 Foglia/Novello II, judgment of 16 Dec. 1981, paras. 16-21. 
156 See, amongst others, ECJ, Case C-467/05 Dell’Orto, judgment of 28 June 2007, para. 
40; Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra, judgment of 13 March 2001, paras. 38-39. For the different 
categories of cases cf. P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law, 5th edn (2011) p. 467 et seq.
157 For one of the rare examples see ECJ, Case C-83/91 Meilicke, judgment of 16 June 1992, 
paras. 30-31.
158 ECJ Pringle, supra n. 30 at paras. 86 et seq.
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level, it is essentially based on the telos to interdict the functional misuse of the 
preliminary reference procedure.159 The court stated: 
Whilst the spirit of cooperation which must govern the performance of the duties 
assigned by Article [267] to the national courts on the one hand and the Court of 
Justice on the other hand requires the latter to have regard to the national court’s 
proper responsibilities, it implies at the same time that the national court, in the use 
which it makes of the facilities provided by Article [267], should have regard to the 
proper function of the Court of Justice in this field.160
The proper function of the court in the context of a preliminary ruling consists, 
however, first and foremost in ensuring the uniform interpretation and application 
of EU law within the Union.161 This is also the reason why the competence to 
declare acts of the EU institutions invalid is attributed to the Court of Justice 
alone.162 This centralization of the competence to interpret and, if necessary, in-
validate EU law is one of the central pillars of the EU’s legal system and has ar-
ticulately and consistently been defended by the ECJ, particularly against 
national constitutional courts.163
The ultra vires review carried out by the German Federal Constitutional Court, 
however, precisely undermines this core function. To declare the OMT reference 
admissible in terms of Article 267 TFEU is therefore not only problematic because 
Karlsruhe’s pretention to have a final say on the matter makes the requested inter-
pretation by the ECJ appear potentially irrelevant and therefore unnecessary.164 
Rather, the reference seems to be an abusive request for a preliminary decision 
insofar as it raises doubts about Karlsruhe’s willingness to accept Luxembourg’s 
monopoly of interpretation as regards EU law. But still, submitting a reference is 
preferable to disregarding Honeywell and carrying out an ultra vires review without 
a reference. If one accepts the highly questionable premise that the applications 
before the FCC can be declared admissible in terms of constitutional law and that 
the FCC has the constitutional mandate to carry out an ultra vires review, submit-
ting a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice appears to be the less invasive 
solution. However, both alternatives conceptually undermine the unity of EU law. 
159 ECJ Foglia/Novello II, supra n. 155 at para. 18; ECJ, Case C-231/89 Gmurzynska-Bscher, 
judgment of 8 Nov. 1990, para. 23.
160 ECJ Foglia/Novello II, supra n. 155 at para. 20, emphasis added.
161 Particularly distinct ECJ, Opinion 1/09 Patents Court, Opinion of 8 March 2011, para. 83.
162 ECJ, Case 314/85 Foto Frost, 22 Oct. 1987, paras. 15 et seq. 
163 In recent times ECJ, Joint Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10 Melki et al., judgment of 22 June 
2010, para. 54. See also A. Pliakos and G. Anagnostaras, ‘Blind Date between Familiar Strangers’, 
15 GLJ (2014) p. 369, 376-377.
164 Diss. opinion Lübbe-Wolff, supra n. 1 at para. 11; see Pernice, supra n. 82.
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Should Luxembourg declare the reference admissible in terms of Article 267 
TFEU (which seems likely in political terms), it would therefore have to strictly 
avoid that this could be (mis)understood as a tacit approval of Karlsruhe’s claimed 
right to carry out ultra vires reviews. Against this backdrop it would be highly 
surprising if the ECJ declared the reference admissible without underlining or 
even concretizing the limits that it has developed in its previous case-law, particu-
larly the necessity that ‘EU law is applied uniformly’.165 The ECJ would in any 
case have to make it crystal clear that it responds to the preliminary questions only 
on the premise that the referring court subsequently accepts the interpretation 
given by the Court of Justice. In this context the ECJ could also refer to the (ad-
mittedly ineffective) possibilities of sanctions under EU law, i.e. the infringement 
proceedings and state liability. Would the ECJ leave the slightest of doubt that the 
rules of EU constitutional law, including those regarding the ECJ’s monopoly of 
interpretation, are to be respected by all actors, including the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, the central purpose of the preliminary reference procedure 
would be threatened. Such a statement of clarification would therefore not only 
be required in the case that the ECJ would not confirm the legal interpretation of 
the FCC. To avoid any semblance of an implicit approval of Karlsruhe’s claim to 
ultra vires review, a clarification would also and particularly be necessary in case 
the interpretation by the ECJ partially resembled that of the FCC. 
The preliminary reference as a call for allegiance
The Federal Constitutional Court confronts the ECJ with its interpretation of EU 
law in the style of a call for allegiance. It is not without good reason that critics 
have likened the preliminary reference to a dictate.166
The occasionally harsh criticism of the FCC’s adjudication with regard to in-
tegration in the past few years167 is sometimes countered with the argument that 
the FCC has, in the end, never prevented an integration project whose constitu-
tionality it has reviewed. If it is true, however, that the relationship between the 
ECJ and the national constitutional courts is not a hierarchical but rather a coop-
erative one, within which one-sided ‘emergency breaks’ are justified precisely by 
the fact that ‘they do not ultimately have to be applied’,168 then the mere fact that 
165 ECJ Melki et al., supra n. 163 at para. 54. 
166 Compare Pliakos and Anagnostaras, supra n. 163 at p. 375; Mayer, supra n. 62 at p. 119.
167 See particularly D. Halberstama and Ch. Möllers, ‘The German Constitutional Court Says 
“Ja zu Deutschland!”’, 10 GLJ (2009) p. 1241; M. Nettesheim, ‘Die Karlsruher Verkündigung’, 
1 Europarecht-Beiheft (2010) p. 101; Ch. Schönberger, ‘Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht’s Epigones 
at Sea’, 10 GLJ (2009) p. 1201.
168 A. Voßkuhle, ‘Der europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund’, NVwZ (2010) p. 1, 3, 7. 
Before already I. Pernice, Das Verhältnis europäischer zu nationalen Gerichten im europäischen Verfas-
sungsverbund (Berlin 2006) p. 53 et seq.
292 Mattias Wendel EuConst 10 (2014)
a court has so far refrained from opting for such a worst-case scenario does not 
already make this court a cooperative one. The decisions’ results are only one in-
dicator for the capacity of national courts to engage in a multi-levelled judicial 
cooperation (Verbundfähigkeit), particularly because the checks and balances in such 
non-hierarchical systems emanate rather from mutual signals and dialogical inter-
actions which need not necessarily be reflected in the decisions’ results. In this 
respect it is not only about what courts say, but also how they say it. Whether or 
not the courts ‘strike the right note’ can be of significance, given the fact that the 
particularly obiter dicta can have important signalling effects.169 The problem of 
the OMT reference lies exactly in the fact that it leaves little room for either actor 
to overcome the issue at hand without losing face.170 That former judge Di Fabio 
makes the following statement in a case note cannot be regarded as a constructive 
contribution either: ‘The European Court of Justice must not behave in the man-
ner of a political institution, especially not with the notable curiosity that the 
European Court’s president is Greek.’171 
A s s e s sm e n t  o f  t h e  OMT  p r o g ramm e  i n  s u b s t a n c e
When assessing the OMT programme in substance, the Federal Constitutional 
Court takes a view that is highly questionable in terms of EU law and by all means 
not clearly preferable to other legal positions defended – which, as we have sug-
gested, should be the decisive threshold.
Transgression of the ECB’s mandate – Pringle inverted
The Court’s reasoning is particularly questionable in that it argues that the OMT 
programme would manifestly transgress the ECB’s mandate under EU primary 
law.
As demonstrated above, a central problem of ultra vires review lies in its hybrid 
review standard, leading to an idiosyncratic interpretation of EU law by the Ger-
man Federal Constitutional Court and ultimately to a distorted view on the EU’s 
order of competences through the lens of German constitutional law. 
For the Court the decisive question was whether the OMT programme ‘en-
croached upon the powers of the Member States for economic policy’.172 How-
ever, this major premise of the Court’s legal assessment inverts the review standard 
of Pringle. In Pringle the ECJ had to decide whether member state actions to es-
tablish the ESM encroached on the exclusive competence of the Union in the area 
169 The critical reaction of the First Senate to the ECJ’s Åkerberg jurisprudence is but an example, 
FCC, Case 1 BvR 1215/07 Counter-terrorism Database, judgment of 24 April 2013, para. 91. 
170 Cf. Bast, supra n. 75 at p. 180.
171 U. Di Fabio, ‘Karlsruhe Makes a Referral’, 15 GLJ (2014) p. 107, 109.
172 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 55 as well as paras. 33, 39 and question 1 lit. a.
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of monetary policy.173 This standard of review was imperative under EU law, for 
an exclusive competence of the EU in a certain field generally prevents member 
states from taking action therein, independent of whether or not the EU has already 
taken actions itself, Article 2(1) TFEU.174 While the ECJ is certainly to be criticized 
for not having explicitly referred to this article in Pringle – unlike Advocate-
General Kokott175 – its approach remains correct in substance.176
Meanwhile, competences of member states do not inversely produce a general 
pre-emptive effect vis-à-vis actions of EU organs.177 Under the Treaties the exercise 
of the Union’s competences is not negatively limited by the category of ‘exclusive’ 
competences of Member States – the proposal of a negative catalogue of such 
‘exclusive’ competences of EU member states was even expressly rejected during 
the European Convention.178 But this is where the approach of the Federal Con-
stitutional Court is ultimately heading when it turns the premises of EU law 
upside-down and essentially asks whether there is an encroachment on the (alleged 
exclusive) competences of member states in the area of economic policy. Looking 
at EU law through the lens of national constitutional law, the Court thus creates 
a national domaine réservé, the violation of which is put on par with a manifest 
violation of competences.179 This reversal of premises allows the Court to hence-
173 ECJ Pringle, supra n. 30 at paras. 48-63 (regarding the question if the introduction of 
Art. 136(3) TFEU complied with the conditions of Art. 48(6) TEU) as well as paras. 93-98 (with 
regard to the conclusion and ratification of the TESM by EU member states). With regard to the 
EU’s (non-exclusive) competence in the area of the coordination of the member states’ economic 
policies, the ECJ stated that the Treaties would ‘not confer any specific power on the Union to 
establish a stability mechanism’ like the ESM (ibid., at paras. 64-68 and 109-111). 
174 Cf. R. Schütze, European Constitutional Law (CUP 2012) p. 164-165. 
175 View (sic) by the A-G Kokott, para. 75.
176 Particularly with regard to the key question whether member state actions under public 
international law encroach upon the EU’s exclusive competence (second preliminary question in 
Pringle). With regard to a possible violation of Art. 48(6) TEU (first preliminary question) one 
could already have stated that the introduction of Art. 136(3) TFEU cannot by any means lead to 
a substantive alteration of the provisions relating to the Union’s exclusive competence in Part I of 
the TFEU. Even under the (legally unconvincing) assumption that this new stipulation had more 
than a declarative character, it would constitute an explicit empowerment systemically foreseen by 
Art. 2(1) TFEU, see view (sic) of the A-G Kokott, para. 51. 
177 See also Bast, supra n. 75 at p. 176.
178 In detail Gustaferro, supra n. 145 at p. 16 et seq. who, however, construes Art. 4(2) TEU 
as being close to ‘a general clause on the exercise of Union competences protecting some national 
core responsibilities’ (ibid., at p. 34). But even if one followed this reading of Art. 4(2) TEU, the 
field of economic policy at national level would certainly not be protected by Art. 4(2) TEU which 
addresses the national identities, inherent in the member states’ ‘fundamental structures, political 
and constitutional’ and the ‘essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of 
the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security’.
179 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 39.
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forth focus on the question whether the OMT is a ‘predominantly economic-
policy act’.180 
The Court’s review standard thus virtually abstracts away from the actual legal 
base of the OMT programme, i.e., Article 18.1 ESCB-Statute.181 Article 18.1 
ESCB-Statute, however, should have been the starting point for any legal review 
of the ECB’s actions in the present context, given that this stipulation explicitly 
entitles the ECB to conduct open market operations – including bond purchases. 
Whereas Article 18.1 ESCB-Statute correspondingly plays a central role in the 
ECB’s considerations,182 the Federal Constitutional Court refers to it rather inci-
dentally.183 Instead, by asking whether the OMT programme is a ‘predominantly 
economic-policy act’ the Karlsruhe creates a review standard of its own, which it 
successfully applies thereafter.
The German Federal Constitutional Court also tries to connect its review stan-
dard to the case-law of the Court of Justice.184 For this the majority in the Second 
Senate recapitulates the three criteria on which the ECJ relied in Pringle when 
qualifying the ESM a measure of economic policy: the objectives to be attained, 
the instruments relied upon and the systematic link to other regulatory frame-
works.185 With regard to the OMT’s objectives, the Federal Constitutional Court 
furthermore refers to the ECJ’s interpretation, according to which the objective 
of maintaining price stability could be clearly distinguished from that of safeguard-
ing the stability of the euro area as a whole186 – a certainly questionable statement 
in terms of its alleged evidence.187 According to the ECJ a measure of economic 
policy cannot be classified as one of monetary policy ‘for the sole reason that it 
may have indirect effects on the stability of the euro’.188 The Federal Constitu-
tional Court applies this reasoning to purchases of government bonds by the ECB. 
Accordingly such purchases ‘may not qualify as acts of monetary policy for the 
sole reason that they also indirectly pursue monetary policy objectives’.189 In and 
of itself, this conclusion does not raise objections.
However, the legal consequences that flow from this conclusion in the context 
of Pringle cannot be applied to the OMT case. The abstract distinction between 
180 Ibid., at para. 69, severely criticized by Heun, supra n. 76 at p. 333, 335.
181 Again Bast, supra n. 75 at p. 175-176.
182 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 11. Compare also the Monthly Bulletin of the ECB of Oct. 
2012, p. 8.
183 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at paras. 55-56, 62 and 90.
184 Ibid., at especially paras. 61-68, as well as para. 96.
185 Ibid., at para. 63.
186 ECJ Pringle, supra n. 30 at para. 56 (referred to by FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 64). 
187 Compare the case note of Ruffert, JZ (2013) p. 257 (who approves the ECJ’s approach in 
an overall view).
188 ECJ Pringle, supra n. 30 at paras. 56 and 97.
189 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 64.
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economic and monetary policy in terms of policy fields had direct legal conse-
quences in Pringle because the ECJ had to assess whether actions taken by EU 
member states under international law encroached upon the exclusive competence 
of the Union in the field of monetary policy, as laid down abstractly in Article 3(1)
(c) TFEU. Whereas Pringle thus concerned the compliance of external member
state actions with the pre-emptive effect of an exclusive EU competence in a certain
(abstract) policy field,190 the OMT ruling concerns the review of an act of an EU
institution taken on the basis of a concrete legal basis of primary law. In such a
scenario legal review must necessarily start from the relevant legal base.
Article 18.1 ESCB-Statue entitles the ECB to use certain specified instruments 
without distinguishing whether these instruments are primarily to be qualified as 
measures of economic or monetary policy. Instead Article 18.1 ESCB-Statute al-
lows the ECB to conduct open market operations in order ‘to achieve the objectives 
of the ESCB and to carry out its tasks’. The primary objective of the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB) is undoubtedly the maintenance of price stabil-
ity, as enshrined in Article 127(1), first sentence, and Article 282(2), second sen-
tence, TFEU.191 Without prejudice to this key objective, the ESCB shall 
furthermore support the general economic policies in the Union, as laid down in 
Article 127(1), second sentence, and Article 282(2), third sentence, TFEU. 
This already demonstrates that the question of legality or illegality of an instru-
ment of open market policy does not correlate with the (by the way contested)192 
dichotomy of monetary and economic policy. Within the framework of open 
market operations the ECB can consequently also take action in the field of ‘eco-
nomic policy’ as far as this serves its objectives.193 Article 18.1 ESCB-Statute thus 
frames the relevant question in terms of a certain finality: does the OMT pro-
gramme serve the principal objective of maintaining price stability and/or does it 
support economic policy? The FCC on the other hand frames it in terms of a 
certain policy field: is the OMT programme a predominantly economic-policy 
act?194 
This is why the ECJ, should it declare the questions admissible, would have to 
precisely define the review standard under EU law and clearly distinguish the 
OMT case from Pringle. It would also have to repulse the claim that the question 
if an EU organ has violated competences can be assessed by asking whether the 
190 Art. 136(3) TFEU only has a declaratory effect according to the ECJ and was not yet in force 
when the Pringle judgment was promulgated.
191 In detail A. Thiele, Das Mandat der EZB und die Krise des Euro (Mohr Siebeck 2013) p. 24 
et seq.
192 See M. Goldmann, ‘Adjudicating Economics?’, 15 GLJ (2014) p. 265, 269 et seq.
193 Heun, supra n. 76 at p. 333.
194 For the distinction between competences based on objectives and policy fields, see Bast, supra 
n. 75 at p. 175.
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EU act at hand falls within a policy field for which the member states essentially 
remain responsible. 
But even if we accepted the premise of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court – just for the sake of the argument and contrary to the argument just made 
– it is hardly convincing to classify the OMT programme as a ‘predominantly
economic-policy act’. The following considerations will focus only on some, al-
beit central arguments in this respect.195
Already the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s elaborations on the OMT programme’s 
objectives raise concerns. Explicitly referring to two Monthly Bulletins by the 
ECB, the Court states that the OMT programme is meant to ‘neutralise spreads 
on government bonds of selected Member States of the euro currency area which 
have emerged in the markets and which adversely affect the refinancing of these 
Member States’.196 It is somewhat surprising that this statement cannot at all be 
inferred from these Bulletins,197 given that they explicitly describe OMTs as ‘mon-
etary policy instrument[s]’ which ‘aim at ensuring an effective transmission of the 
Eurosystem’s monetary policy and, hereby, at securing the conditions for an effec-
tive conduct of the single monetary policy within the euro area, with a view to 
achieving its primary objective of maintaining price stability’.198 
The FCC continues to handle the assessments of the ECB in a remarkable way, 
given that it prioritizes the ‘convincing expertise’ of the Bundesbank over that of 
the ECB.199 This already surprises with regard to the fact that the Bundesbank is 
subjected to ECB instructions,200 but particularly with regard to the legal inde-
pendence and specific expertise of the ECB which should necessarily entail a wide 
margin of discretion to be respected by the Court.201 However, the ECB’s claim 
that the OMT programme aims to safeguard an appropriate monetary policy 
transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy202 is explicitly considered 
irrelevant by the Bundesverfassungsgericht.203 According to the majority in the 
Second Senate: 
195 For further arguments, see T. Beukers, ‘In the ECB We Do Not Trust’, 15 GLJ (2014) p. 343, 
349 et seq. and Heun, supra n. 76 at p. 334-335.
196 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 70, emphasis added.
197 For a comprehensive criticism of the FCC’s practice of citation, see Heun, supra n. 76 at 
p. 333 et seq. with further examples.
198 ECB Monthly Bulletin, Oct. 2012, p. 7. According to the Monthly Bulletin of Sept. 2012
on p. 7: ‘OMTs aim at safeguarding the transmission mechanism in all euro area countries and the 
singleness of the monetary policy.’
199 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 71.
200 Compare Ch. Herrmann, ‘Luxemburg, wir haben ein Problem!’, EuZW (2014) p. 161, 162.
201 For a detailed assessment of this problem, see Goldmann, supra n. 192, p. 266 et seq.
202 Press release of 6 Sept. 2012, supra n. 3. This objective is also mentioned in FCC OMT, supra 
n. 2 at para. 2, 7, 95 et seq.
203 Critique also by Beukers, supra n. 195 p. 348-349.
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The fact that the purchase of government bonds can, under certain conditions [also], 
help to support the monetary policy objectives of the European System of Central 
Banks does not turn the OMT Decision itself into an act of monetary policy. In this 
respect, it also applies vice versa what the Court of Justice has said regarding the 
allocation of assistance measures of the European Stability Mechanism […]. The 
(economic) accuracy or plausibility of the reasons for the OMT Decision are irrelevant 
in this respect.204
Of course this merely ‘proves’ what was postulated in the first place, namely the 
assertion that the announced purchase of government bonds could ‘under certain 
conditions also’ (unter Umständen auch) have implications for monetary policy 
– in short, that its monetary character would only be of a secondary nature. How-
ever, the assessment of the programme’s potential effects essentially depends on an
economic evaluation. In other words, the argument which the Federal Constitu-
tional Court derives from Pringle only works on the basis of an economic estima-
tion that the OMT programme merely produces ‘indirect effects on the stability
of the euro’. This is exactly what the ECB denies on the basis of a sound eco-
nomic assessment that the Court cannot just replace with its own economic eval-
uation without itself overstepping its legal mandate.
Another argument for the Bundesverfassungsgericht to qualify the OMT pro-
gramme as an act falling predominantly in the field of economic policy is the fact 
that the ECB links the purchase of bonds to the conditionality of the macroeco-
nomic assistance programmes. In the eyes of the Court, the OMT programme 
thus appears to be functionally equivalent to the ESM and the EFSF, but lacking 
democratic control.205 The converse argument seems more convincing, however: 
Precisely the fact that the European Central Bank attaches its OMT programme 
to the conditionality of the assistance programmes demonstrates that it does not 
pursue an economic policy of its own, but that it rather limits itself to the mere 
support of the existing economic policy in accordance with its mandate.206 By 
referring to the macroeconomic conditions of the rescue measures, the ECB ac-
cepts political decisions which are ultimately taken by other actors (compare Ar-
ticle 13 TESM) and which are – and in Germany have to be207 – subject to 
parliamentary accountability. According to this interpretation it even seems neces-
204 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 96, emphasis added.
205 Ibid., at para. 79.
206 Aptly Bast, supra n. 75 at p. 178. 
207 See § 4 para. 1, no. 1, 2 in conjunction with para. 2 of the German ESM Financing Act. See 
on the necessity of the constitutive parliamentary approval FCC ESM & TSCG (summary review), 
supra n. 21 at para. 274 [EN 2014], confirmed in FCC ESM & TSCG (principal proceedings), supra 
n. 28 at para. 217. For the situation in Finland, see P. Leino and J. Salminen, ‘The Euro Crisis and
Its Constitutional Consequences for Finland’, 9 EuConst (2013) p. 451 et seq.
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sary for the ECB to attach OMTs to the conditionality of the assistance programmes 
in order to act within the boundaries of its mandate. 
It would not be surprising if the Court of Justice would, on the basis of a review 
starting from Article 18.1 ESCB-Statute and explicitly acknowledging the ECB’s 
economic margin of appreciation, consider the OMT programme to be in ac-
cordance with the Treaties not despite but because of its attachment to the condi-
tionality of the assistance programmes and the fact that it serves the objective of 
price stability according to the independent economic assessment of the ECB.
Article 123 TFEU
With view to a possible breach of Article 123 TFEU it is important to note that 
this provision, according to its wording, only prohibits the ‘direct’ purchase of 
debt instruments from member states by the ECB, i.e., the purchase of government 
bonds on the primary market.
In its summary review of 2012 the Federal Constitutional Court already noted 
that it considers purchases on the secondary market ‘aiming at financing the Mem-
bers’ budgets independently of the capital markets’ to be prohibited too, as they 
would ‘circumvent the prohibition of monetary financing’.208 This section is no-
tably absent in the OMT reference. Although the Court continues to assume that 
Article 123 TFEU must not be circumvented by certain purchases on the second-
ary market, it fails to apply its own criterion of intent, i.e., the requirement that 
the measure at hand must have the specific purpose of financing national budgets 
independent from capital markets.209
In a rather abstract and general manner the Court postulates that Article 123 
TFEU would not be limited to purchases on the primary market, but rather is the 
‘expression of a broader prohibition of monetary financing of the budget’.210 Again 
it is astonishing to see how the Second Senate’s majority tries to back up its argu-
ment with references to external sources which do not at all underpin its argument. 
The three sources it cites – amongst the authors is Judge and Vice President of the 
ECJ, Koen Lenaerts, as well as a Member of the Legal Service of the Council, 
Alberto de Gregorio Merino211 – do not in fact support the majority’s interpreta-
tion of Article 123 TFEU in this respect.212 
208 FCC ESM & TSCG (summary review), supra n. 21 at para. 278 [EN 2014], emphasis added.
209 For this criterion see Wendel, supra n. 27 at p. 51.
210 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 85.
211 The FCC refers to V. Borger, ‘The ESM and the European Court’s Predicament in Pringle’, 
14 GLJ (2013) p. 113, 119, 134; de Gregorio Merino, supra n. 34 at p. 1625 (there at footnote 
36) and p. 1627; Koen Lenaerts and Piet Van Nuffel, European Union Law, 3rd edn (2011)
para. 11-037.
212 For harsh criticism see Heun, supra n. 76 at p. 335. Cf. also Thiele, supra n. 76 at p. 245 
(there at footnote 32).
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In substance, it is convincing, however, that Article 123 TFEU does not allow 
the ECB to purchase government bonds on the secondary market under all cir-
cumstances. This does not result primarily from the 7th recital of Regulation (EC) 
No. 3603/93,213 but rather from the rationale behind Article 123 TFEU. In this 
respect the Federal Constitutional Court correctly acknowledges the key role that 
teleological interpretation plays in the ECJ’s reasoning.214 As demonstrated by the 
interpretation of Article 125 TFEU in Pringle, the ECJ sometimes also defines the 
telos in reference to a provision’s genesis.215 According to the ECJ, Article 125 
TFEU aims to ensure a sound budgetary policy at the national level. The article 
was to guarantee ‘that the Member States remain subject to the logic of the market 
when they enter into debt, since that ought to prompt them to maintain budget-
ary discipline’.216 This is also the key goal of Article 123 TFEU,217 an understand-
ing similarly supported by historical evidence.218 As a matter of fact, (fiscal) 
budgetary discipline ultimately contributes to the maintenance of price stability 
as the primary (monetary) goal.
The ECJ declared the ESM to be in conformity with EU law precisely because 
of the ESM’s strict conditionality, which would prevent the incentive of member 
states to conduct sound budgetary policies from being undermined.219 One may 
ask, of course, whether the disciplinary effects of market mechanisms can be con-
sidered functionally equivalent to the regulative effects of the reform programmes 
at all.220 The previous practice, namely the efforts of all countries affected to escape 
the rescue mechanisms as soon as possible,221 seems to prove the disciplining (if 
not deterrent) character of the programmes, however.222 
With regard to Article 123 TFEU this also means: precisely the fact that the 
OMT programme is linked to the conditionality of the rescue measures speaks 
not against, but in favour of its conformity with EU law. It would therefore only 
be consistent if the ECJ – in accordance with its reading of Article 125 TFEU – 
213 Although this particularly addressed the national level. 
214 FCC OMT, supra n. 2, at paras. 85-86. 
215 ECJ Pringle, supra n. 30, at para. 135.
216 Ibid., at para. 135.
217 Compare U. Häde, ‘Die europäische Währungsunion in der internationalen Finanzkrise’, 
EuR (2010) p. 854, 856; U. Häde, in Ch. Calliess and M. Ruffert (eds.), EUV/AEUV, 4th edn 
(2011), Article 123 TFEU, para. 2.
218 Cf. the EMU draft treaty referenced by the ECJ, printed in the EC Bulletin, Supplement 
2/91, p. 55-56 and 58.
219 ECJ Pringle, supra n. 30 at paras. 136-137 and 143.
220 Aptly M. Nettesheim, ‘Europarechtskonformität des Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus’, 
NJW (2013) p. 14, 16.
221 Like Portugal in recent times. 
222 Assessing the empirical effects however requires, once again, a margin of discretion a court 
has to respect.
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interpreted Article 123 TFEU in a way that allows for ECB purchases of govern-
ment bonds on the secondary market as long as this does not interfere with price 
stability and the member states do not lose the incentive for having sound budget-
ary policies.223 Whether or not the ECJ will establish further conditions for an 
(unlikely) future implementation of the OMT programme is hard to predict. 
While it corresponds to an interpretation – rather widely accepted in the literature 
– that Article 123 TFEU also prohibits certain kinds of purchases on the second-
ary market in order to prevent a bypassing of its rationale,224 the concrete scope
of such a prohibition of circumvention remains an open question so far.225 It is
highly plausible, however, that it does not at any rate extend to cases in which the
purchase of government bonds on the secondary market by the ECB is deemed
necessary for guaranteeing the stability of the euro, as price stability necessarily
presupposes the stability of the currency as a whole.226 In this light the legal in-
terpretation of the Court that the OMT programme (manifestly!) violates Article
123 TFEU seems far from convincing.227
Judicial restraint – lost?
The defining attribute of the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision on the ESM 
and the TSCG of 2012 was its sensitivity vis-à-vis the (national) legislature. Cen-
tral parts of the decisions’ ratio decidendi are shaped by techniques of judicial 
constraint, be it by respecting the legislature’s margin of assessment, be it through 
223 Accordingly Thym, supra n. 31 at p. 263 and Thym and Wendel, supra n. 32 at p. 749.
224 See among others A. Kämmerer, in R. Siekmann (ed.), EWU (2013) Art. 123 TFEU, paras. 
23 et seq.; Thym, supra n. 31 at p. 263; Ruffert, supra n. 34 at p. 1787-1788; D. Hattenberger, in J. 
Schwarze (ed.), EU-Kommentar, 3rd edn (2012), Art. 123 TFEU, para. 6; R. Bandilla, in Grabitz/
Hilf/Nettesheim (eds.), Das Recht der Europäischen Union, 44th update (2011), Art. 123 TFEU, 
para. 9.
225 Similar findings by B. Kempen, in R. Streinz (ed.), EUV/AEUV, 2nd edn (2012), Art. 123 
TFEU, para. 5.
226 Ch. Herrmann, ‘Die Bewältigung der Euro-Staatsschulden-Krise an den Grenzen des 
deutschen und europäischen Währungsverfassungsrechts’, EuZW (2012) p. 805, 811. See also 
Beukers, supra n. 195 at p. 360 et seq. Differently, however, FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 72: 
‘As for the European Central Bank claiming to safeguard the current composition of the euro 
currency area with the OMT Decision (…), this is obviously not a task of monetary policy but 
one of economic policy, which remains a responsibility of the Member States. Pursuant to Art. 
140 TFEU, the decisions on the composition of the euro currency area are the responsibility of 
the Council, the European Parliament, the Commission and the Member States.’ This argument is 
self-contradictory, see also Bast, supra n. 75 at p. 177-178. 
227 For further arguments cf. Heun, supra n. 76 at p. 334.
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the application of restrictive review standards.228 The same is true for the decision 
on the principal proceedings of 2014.229 
Such wise caution is unfortunately lacking in the OMT reference. There is a 
distinct difference between the wide margin of discretion granted to the German 
Bundestag on the one hand and the failure to even mention any possible leeway 
for the ECB on the other hand. This is quite astounding given the fact that the 
ECB’s independence both in terms of Union and national law seems to at least 
imply such a margin of discretion. The ECB is responsible for a dynamic and 
complex set of tasks where decisions are made on the basis of prognoses that require 
specific technical knowhow and the ability to flexibly generate (new) knowledge 
and strategies. This explains the calls for limiting the Court’s review to a mere 
‘rationality check’ instead of a full review.230
In terms of German constitutional law, this argument can be rooted in Article 
88, second sentence, GG, according to which the ECB is independent and com-
mitted to the overriding goal of ensuring price stability. This provision essentially 
legalizes the limited democratic control over ECB actions.231 In its Maastricht 
judgment the Federal Constitutional Court considered this new article as being a 
specific modification of the principle of democracy based on the assumption – which 
was, according to the Court, ‘tried and tested in the German legal order, and also 
by the scientific community’ – that an independent central bank is in a better 
position to ensure price stability than politicians.232 But if this is so, then the in-
dependence of the ECB cannot be challenged with reference to the (specifically 
modified) principle of democracy under constitutional law. When the Court now 
considers the independence of the ECB a ‘divergence’ from the democracy prin-
ciple and assumes that the ECB’s mandate would have to be ‘shaped narrowly’ in 
order ‘to meet democratic requirements’,233 it applies a much more restrictive ap-
proach than it did in its previous Maastricht judgment. In other words, the ECB’s 
independence which was initially constitutionally demanded is now turned into one 
that is barely in conformity with the essence of the principle of democracy.
According to the Court, the boundaries of the ECB’s mandate are ‘fully subject 
to judicial review’ which, as is admitted, would fall under the primary responsibil-
228 FCC ESM & TSCG (summary review), supra n. 21 at paras. 213, 217, 222, 228, 234, 271 
[EN 2014]. For details see Wendel, supra n. 27 at p. 41 et seq. 
229 FCC ESM & TSCG (principal proceedings), supra n. 28 at paras. 164, 173 f., 175, 181, 184 
f., 216.
230 Goldmann, supra n. 192, p. 266-267. See furthermore Thym, supra n. 31 at p. 263; Mayer, 
supra n. 62 at p. 135; Herrmann, supra n. 226 at p. 810; Kumm, supra n. 138 at p. 214; Heun, supra 
n. 76 at p. 336; Bast, supra n. 75 at p. 176-177.
231 I. Pernice, in H. Dreier (ed.), GG, 2nd edn (2008), Art. 88 GG, para. 26.
232 FCC Maastricht, supra n. 44 at para. 154, repeated in FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 32.
233 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at paras. 58-59.
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ity of the Court of Justice.234 Of course German constitutional law standards are 
still not binding for the ECJ. This is also why the Federal Constitutional Court 
refers to EU case-law in order to establish that judicial review regarding the de-
limitation of competences would not interfere with the ECB’s independence.235 
The quoted judgment of the ECJ does not, however, deal with the question how 
intense the review powers of the Court of Justice are vis-à-vis the ECB with regard 
to its mandate. It rather addresses the question in how far the ECB is subject to 
the legislative framework regulating the investigative powers of the European 
Anti-Fraud Office.236
A general exclusion of any margin of appreciation would certainly be inap-
propriate. After all, the question about the ‘specific content’ of the ECB’s actual 
powers (in this respect Karlsruhe recognizes the ECB’s independence) can hardly 
be detached from the question of the division of competences. As demonstrated 
above, the key point of the legal assessment, on the basis of Article 18.1 ESCB-
Statute, is not whether or not the OMT programme is to be considered a pre-
dominantly economic-policy act, but whether or not the OMT programme furthers 
the objectives of the ESCB. Evaluating the adequacy of the OMT programme 
with regard to this finality presupposes economic assessments and prognoses about 
the programme’s actual effects within the framework of a highly volatile context. 
This does not imply, as the Federal Constitutional Court suggests, that no judicial 
control would be the only alternative (which it rejects); rather this is a reason to 
respect certain margins of appreciation for economic assessments, the boundaries 
of which a court can only submit to a ‘rationality check’.237 
When the Federal Constitutional Court openly invites the ECJ to carry out a 
full judicial review, the latter would be well advised to act with caution. It will be 
a particularly demanding task for the Court of Justice to delineate the extent of 
the ECB’s margin of discretion, which legally emanates from its independence 
under Article 130 TFEU. With regard to the necessity of the decision under Ar-
ticle 267(1) TFEU, the question arises whether the ECJ could consider limiting 
its review to the question of the presence of a manifest violation, given that only 
such a qualified violation could be relevant within the framework of an ultra vires 
review. However, such an approach would certainly not create legal certainty and 
thus contradict the mandate of the Court under Article 19(2) TEU to uphold the 
rule of law in its interpretation and application of the treaties.
234 Ibid., at para. 58.
235 Ibid., at para. 60.
236 ECJ, Case C-11/00 Commission/ECB, judgment of 10 July 2003, para. 135. The judgment 
only includes an abstract statement that the ECB is generally subject to review by the Court of 
Justice and the Court of Auditors.
237 Again Goldmann, supra n. 192, p. 266-267.
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Transnational dimension: comparative legal reasoning
Beyond the framework of Union and national constitutional law in a narrower 
sense, the OMT reference as well as the ESM decision on the principal proceedings 
reveal an interesting transnational dimension. In both decisions the German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court relies on comparative constitutional law in order to 
support its argument. The Court thus confirms the EU wide phenomenon of 
comparative legal reasoning which contributes to a transnational dialogue between 
constitutional courts.238 
In its ESM decision the Second Senate makes multiple references to decisions 
taken by its Estonian,239 French240 and Austrian241 counterparts. It has never made 
more references to foreign case-law in any other judgment before. However, as in 
its previous case-law, in the ESM decision the Court’s comparative ‘reasoning’ only 
takes the form of selective cross-references with the aim of making the argument 
more compelling. The Court thus relies on an external ‘persuasive authority’242 
that is meant to increase the persuasiveness of its own argument. Of course the 
open use of comparative arguments is only one apparent element of inter-judicial 
relations. However, as far as a court makes comparative law a deliberate part of its 
argument in its ratio decidendi the role of comparative reasoning cannot anymore 
be reduced to that of an auxiliary hermeneutic instrument or a reference to per-
suasive (external) authority. From a transnational perspective, comparative reason-
ing appears to become a mode of judicial dialogue that allows constitutional courts 
to engage in a European-wide process of shaping a ‘new’ ius publicum europae.243
With regard to the audience of comparative law arguments, the determination 
of common standards could certainly also be understood as a demonstration of 
collective opposition against the ECJ. This is a plausible understanding of what 
the Federal Constitutional Court does in its OMT reference when it refers to a 
whole range of EU-related case-law in other member states.244 According to the 
Court, the
238 For a detailed assessment of the EU related case-law, see M. Wendel, ‘Comparative 
Reasoning and the Making of a Common Constitutional Law’, ICON (2013) p. 981 et seq. For an 
analysis beyond the EU related case-law see now also M. Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European 
Supreme Courts (OUP 2013).
239 FCC ESM & TSCG (principal proceedings), supra n. 28 at paras. 211, 220.
240 Ibid., at para. 244.
241 Ibid., at paras. 188, 214, 221, 243.
242 On this concept see H.P. Glenn, ‘Persuasive Authority’, 32 McGill Law Journal (1987) 
p. 261 et seq.
243 For details see A. von Bogdandy and S. Hinghofer-Szalkay, ‘Das etwas unheimliche Ius
Publicum Europaeum’, 73 ZaöRV (2013) p. 209, 212 et seq.
244 Cf. Mayer, supra n. 62 at p. 134.
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principles concerning the protection of the constitutional identity and of the limits 
of the transfer of sovereign powers to the European Union can also be found, with 
modifications depending on the existence or non-existence of unamendable elements 
in the respective national constitutions, in the constitutional law of many other 
Member States of the European Union.245
It is correct that the concept of ultra vires review has been taken up by several 
other courts on different occasions, namely the Danish Supreme Court,246 the 
Polish Constitutional Tribunal247 and the Czech Constitutional Court.248 Com-
parable approaches are discussed particularly in Hungarian and Estonian consti-
tutional law.249 There are significant differences, however. Apart from the FCC 
only the Czech Constitutional Court has exercised an ultra vires review in judicial 
practice so far,250 although in the specific context of this case EU law appeared to 
be not the reason behind, but rather the means for carrying out a conflict between 
the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Administrative Court.251
With regard to the identity review, it is important to note that conceptual dif-
ferences are not necessarily related to the ‘existence or non-existence’ of provisions 
that establish substantial limits on constitutional amendments as the Federal Con-
stitutional Court suggests. The identity approach taken by the FCC is rather unique 
in Europe. No other constitutional court within the EU has spelled out an eter-
nity clause in the EU context as extensively as the FCC has done. This is particu-
larly true for the jurisprudence of the French Constitutional Council, but also for 
a range of other member states whose constitutions include prohibitions on con-
stitutional amendments.252 The Czech Constitutional Court has even openly ob-
jected to the FCC’s approach, a rather rare phenomenon.253 
245 FCC OMT, supra n. 2 at para. 30.
246 Danish Highest Court, Case I 361/1997 Carlsen/Rasmussen, judgment of 6 April 1998. 
247 Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Case K 18/04 Treaty of Accession, judgment of 5 Nov. 2005.
248 Czech Constitutional Court, Case Pl. ÚS 19/08 Treaty of Lisbon I, judgment of 26 Nov. 
2008, paras. 120, 139 and 216.
249 For a detailed assessment see Wendel, supra n. 46 at p. 468 ff.
250 Czech Constitutional Court, Case Pl. ÚS 5/12 Slovaq Pensions, judgment of 31 Jan. 2012, 
part VII. See J. Komárek, ‘Czech Constitutional Court Playing with Matches’, EuConst (2012) 
p. 323 et seq.
251 The dispute was ultimately resolved for other reasons. For a comprehensive assessment see
M. Bobek, ‘Landtová, Holubec, and the Problem of an Uncooperative Court’, EuConst (2014)
p. 54 et seq.
252 Wendel, supra n. 46 at p. 331 et seq.
253 Czech Constitutional Court, Case Pl. ÚS 29/09 Lisabon II, judgment of 3 Nov. 2009, para.
113.
305Exceeding Judicial Competence in the Name of Democracy
Outlook: What role for constitutional courts in preliminary 
ruling proceedings? 
From an overall view the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s OMT reference reveals an 
intrinsic paradox: In a doubtlessly well-intentioned effort to protect the principle 
of democracy against an alleged transgression of the ECB’s mandate under the 
Treaties, the FCC itself exceeds the limits of its mandate under the German Basic 
Law. Whether or not the Court will find its way out of this difficult situation in 
which it has manoeuvred itself depends to a large extent on the ECJ and its han-
dling of the OMT case. At any rate, the judges in Karlsruhe did not make it easy 
for their colleagues in Luxembourg.
Of all the possible scenarios254 it seems unlikely that the Court of Justice will 
follow the Federal Constitutional Court’s reasoning in an outright way. If Luxem-
bourg declares the preliminary questions admissible – albeit underlining its mo-
nopoly of interpretation – it seems reasonable that it will emphasize the ECB’s 
economic margin of discretion and will allow the OMT programme under the 
conditions that it neither undermines price stability nor the incentive for member 
states to adopt sound budgetary policies. Timing also plays a crucial role. Since 
the ECJ is not engaging in an accelerated procedure,255 its preliminary ruling can 
be expected roughly in about one and a half years. The OMT programme may 
have already been abandoned at that stage. With regard to the danger of deflation 
we hear a lot about ‘quantitative easing’ these days.256 In case the OMT programme 
was put to an end, the ECJ could approach the Federal Constitutional Court with 
regard to a possible termination of the proceedings. 
Conversely it would be remarkable if the German Federal Constitutional Court 
ultimately declared the OMT programme to be ultra vires and provoked an open 
conflict. The lack of precision and effectiveness of the legal consequences raises 
doubts about the sincerity of the Court’s threat scenario.257 On the other hand it 
also diminishes the effective risk posed by declaring the OMT programme ultra 
vires. At any rate, Karlsruhe still has a trump up its sleeve: in the aftermath of the 
ECJ’s decision it could apply the same standards that it developed in Honeywell 
specifically for the ultra vires review of ECJ adjudication. According to its own 
standards the Federal Constitutional Court has to respect ‘the Union’s own meth-
ods of justice’ as well as the Court’s ‘right to tolerance of error’.258 It is hence 
254 Cf. Mayer, supra n. 62 at p.134.
255 Unlike in Pringle where the Irish Supreme Court successfully demanded the accelerated 
procedure to be applied, see on that Fahey and Bardutzky, supra n. 14 at p. 109. 
256 On this Fahey and Bardutzky, supra n. 14, at p. 122.
257 In this sense diss. opinion Lübbe-Wolff, supra n. 1 at para. 28.
258 FCC Honeywell, supra n. 64 at para. 66.
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not a matter for the Federal Constitutional Court in questions of the interpretation 
of Union law which with a methodical interpretation of the statute can lead to dif-
ferent outcomes in the usual legal science discussion framework, to supplant the 
interpretation of the Court of Justice with an interpretation of its own.259
The decision of the ECJ will certainly lie within this discursive ‘framework’. This 
gives reason to expect that an open conflict will be avoided even in case the ECJ 
does not follow the FCC’s approach to a large extent. One may hope, nonetheless, 
that the OMT reference did not set a precedent for future cases. 
But how could a better preliminary reference by a national constitutional court 
look like? What exactly could be the added value of a preliminary reference by 
national constitutional courts? The scholarship has paid far too little attention to 
this important question so far.260 Perhaps this is also due to a lack of empirical evi-
dence. National constitutional courts have long been more than cautious to take 
the route to Luxembourg. However, the practice has markedly increased over the 
past few years.261 Constitutional courts in Austria,262 Belgium,263 Lithuania,264 
Italy265 and Spain266 as well as the French Constitutional Council267 have all referred 
to the ECJ in the framework of Article 267 TFEU. None of these proceedings was 
embedded in an ultra vires review.
Looking ahead, two fields appear to be particularly promising for preliminary 
references of national constitutional courts. On the one hand, they can make a 
contribution to safeguarding federal plurality, as demonstrated above within the 
context of the identity clause (Article 4(2), first sentence, TEU). On the other 
259 Ibid. 
260 But see henceforth J. Komárek, ‘National constitutional courts and the European Constitu-
tional Democracy’, ICON (2014 forthcoming).
261 Cf. still G. Martinico, ‘Preliminary Reference and Constitutional Courts’, in F. Fontanelli et 
al. (eds.), Shaping Rule of Law Through Dialogue (2010) p. 221, 224 et seq.
262 Preliminary references led, amongst others, to Cases C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline; 
C-171/01 Wählergruppe Gemeinsam, C-465/00 et al. Österreichischer Rundfunk; C-293/12 and
C-594/12 Digital Rights et al. (Data Retention II).
263 Preliminary references led, amongst others, to Cases C-93/97 Fédération belge des chambres
syndicales de médecins; C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld (European Arrest Warrant); Case C-305/05 
Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone; C-212/06 Gouvernement de la Communauté 
française et Gouvernement wallon. 
264 A preliminary reference led to Case C-239/07 Sabatauskas.
265 Preliminary references led to Case C-169/08 Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v. Regione 
Sardegna, cf. the case note by G. della Cananea, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court and The 
European Court of Justice’, 14 EPL (2008) p. 523 et seq., and to Case C-418/13 Napolitano et al., 
cf. O, Pollicino, ‘From Partial to Full Dialogue with Luxembourg’,10 EuConst (2014) p. 143 et seq.
266 A preliminary reference led to Case C-399/11 Melloni. See the case note by A. Torres Pérez, 
8 EuConst (2012) p. 105 et seq. 
267 A preliminary reference led to Case C-168/13 PPU Jeremy F. See A. Dyevre, ‘If You Can’t 
Beat Them, Join Them’, 10 EuConst (2014) p. 154 et seq.
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hand, they can serve as an impulse, a driving force for the development of funda-
mental rights at EU level. This particular function must not be left to ordinary 
and specialized courts alone in the long run. The substantive coherence between 
national and Union fundamental rights – expressed today already in provisions 
such as Article 52(4) of the Charter – would thus receive a procedural or ‘formal 
tie’,268 Of course the ECJ will not always be able to meet the demands of na-
tional constitutional courts, as demonstrated by the Melloni judgment, doubt-
lessly worthy of criticism in its handling of the arguments of the Spanish 
Constitutional Court.269 That national constitutional and highest courts can nev-
ertheless lay the foundations for an advancement of fundamental rights adjudica-
tion at EU level is illustrated by the ECJ’s recent judgment on data retention – a 
milestone of fundamental rights protection at EU level.270 
Karlsruhe had the chance to initiate this development already back in 2010. 
May the Bundesverfassungsgericht henceforth remind itself of the path-breaking 
and exemplary nature of its widely acknowledged fundamental rights adjudication 
and seize such opportunity for the benefit of fundamental rights protection in 
Europe in the future.
268 See already I. Pernice, Grundrechtsgehalte im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht (Nomos 1979) 
p. 239-240.
269 ECJ, Case C-399/11 Melloni, judgment of 26 Feb. 2013, paras. 55 et seq.
270 ECJ, Joint Cases C-293/12 u. C-594/12 Digital Rights u.a. (Data Retention II), judgment of
8 April 2014. In addition to the reference by the Austrian Constitutional Court (C-594/12), the 
judgment also goes back to a reference by the Irish High Court (C-293/12).
q
